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Abstract
Short-time work programs were revived by the Great Recession. To understand their operating
mechanisms, we rst provide a model showing that short-time work may save jobs in rms hit
by strong negative revenue shocks, but not in less severely-hit rms, where hours worked are
reduced, without saving jobs. The cost of saving jobs is low because short-time work targets
those at risk of being destroyed. Using extremely detailed data on the administration of the
program covering the universe of French establishments, we devise a causal identication strat-
egy based on the geography of the program that demonstrates that short-time work saved jobs
in rms faced with large drops in their revenues during the Great Recession, in particular when
highly levered, but only in these rms. The measured cost per saved job is shown to be very
low relative to that of other employment policies.
Keywords: short-time work, unemployment, employment.
JEL codes: E24, J22, J65.
1 Introduction1
Also called short-time compensation, short-time work is a public program intended to preserve
jobs at rms or establishments experiencing temporarily-low revenues, by providing wage sup-
port to the employees the rm wishes to keep with reduced work hours. The 2008-2009 Great
Recession gave OECD countries the opportunity to expand on such short-time work programs:
whereas the OECD average take-up rate was less than 0.2% in the fourth quarter of 2007, just
before the Recession, it increased six-fold, to 1.3 %, in the fourth quarter of 2009. The United-
States followed this pattern, with the number of participants in short-time work jumping from
48,924 in 2007 to 288,618 in 2009.2 Promotion of short-time work by U.S. States was further
boosted by the Job Creation Act of 2012, resulting in 22 States receiving Federal subsidies for
this policy in 2016.3 However, despite short-time work increasing in popularity, even in recent
academic work,4 very little is known about its causal impact on employment.
Our paper contributes to ll this gap by taking advantage of the massive expansion of
the French short-time work program during the Great Recession. From the end of 2008, the
Ministry of Labor not only expanded the policys budget, but also wrote circulars and directives,
in order to promote the use of short-time work as rapidly as possible. As a result, the share
of employees on short-time work increased from 0.3%, in 2007 just before the Great Recession,
to 4% in 2009, the year of program expansion (Figure 1). Subsidies per non-worked hour
and subsidies per employee were respectively multiplied by 1.4 and by 2.5 between these two
dates (Figure 2). The cost of the policy trebled, multiplied by a factor of 20. By precisely
analyzing the program, both in its principles and in its practical implementation, we show to
what extent, and explain why, short-time work works, both from a theoretical and an empirical
perspective. We rst develop a directed search and matching model with multi-worker rms,
which shows when and why short-time work saves jobs; then, we develop an empirical strategy
that takes full advantage of the details and mechanics of the program administration, as well
1We thank Katharine Abraham, Joseph Altonji, Geo¤rey Barrows, Russell Cooper, Denis Fougère, Andrea
Garnero, Alexander Hijzen, Pedro Portugal, Rune Vejlin and André Zylberberg for helpful comments. We
also thanks participants in seminars at Aarhus University, Bank of Italy, Banque de France, CREST, Ecole
Polytechnique, IZA, OECD, University of Louvain la Neuve.
2Hijzen and Venn (2011), Hizjen and Martin (2013).
3Department of Labor (2016)
4See Baller et al. (2016), Cooper et al. (2017), Giroud and Mueller (2017), Houseman et al. (2017),
Niedermayer and Tilly (2017) and the literature surveyed below.
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as the remarkable data sources this administration generates to identify the causal e¤ect of the
program. It turns out that estimation results fully match theoretical predictions.
On the theoretical side, we demonstrate how short-time work saves jobs when rms face a
sharp drop in their revenues. We also show that rms facing a limited decrease in revenues are
likely to use short-time work to reduce hours for jobs at no risk of being destroyed. In fact,
short-time work is shown to be particularly helpful for credit-constrained rms which use the
program to partly nance the jobs they need to hoard during a very negative shock.5 Despite
the potential windfall e¤ects just mentioned for mildly-hit or credit-unconstrained rms, the
cost per saved job is shown to be small compared with other employment policies. In contrast
to wage subsidies paid independently of hours worked, short-time work gives rms the right
incentives to use subsidies for jobs at risk of being destroyed rather than other jobs, insofar as
they pay a fraction of the remuneration of non-worked hours. To put it di¤erently, because rms
will select those jobs at risk of being destroyed for inclusion within short-time work programs,
low-productivity jobs that may need nancial support to survive during recessions are targeted
much more precisely than what most other policies such as wage subsidies can do. Hence, short-
time work can help in sustaining employment in recessions at a small cost. Our model shows
that short-time work may indeed raise the total number of hours worked for the rms using
short-time work when hit by large negative productivity shocks.
On the empirical side, we use administrative data providing remarkably detailed information
about short-time work use, employment, and nancial characteristics for all French establish-
ments at annual frequency over the period 2007-2011. To deal with the selection of rms into
short-time work, we document the role of the local administration in charge of managing the
policy at the local (département) level. The local administration duties comprise informing
rms about the policy, the management of applications, and the payment of short-time work
subsidies to rms. Their autonomy in management creates strong behavioral heterogeneity, in
particular in their response time to applications, across the 95 départements of mainland France
before the Great Recession. This administrative response time is shown to play a key role in
the implementation of short-time work. We also document how the policy di¤uses from one
rm to another at the local level. Geographical proximity of short-time work users before the
recession is shown to favor the use of short-time work in 2009, controlling for the response
5See Caggese et al. (2018) and Giroud and Mueller (2017) for their very interesting discussion of the impact
of nancial constraints on labor hoarding.
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time of the administration. In particular, short-time work use di¤uses in 2009 from those
multi-establishment rms which used short-time work in 2008 because they were located in a
département with a short response time. Hence, rm-to-rm di¤usion, even though unknown
in its exact details, appears to have a key role. This di¤usion may stem from rm-to-rm
information transmission.6 It may also arise from a not going alone e¤ect, which reduces
the negative signal (for potential nancial di¢ culties) associated with using short-time work
vis à vis the rms employees, the rms trading partners, or the rms creditors. Because a)
the response time of the département before 2009 has an impact on short-time work use in
2009 of single-establishment and multi-establishment rms and b) short-time work use di¤uses
from multi-establishment rms to the other rms, we construct the following instruments for
the use of short-time work in 2009 for rms which did not use short-time work in the two
years preceding 2009 a) the 2008 response time to short-time work applications in the rms
département and b) by the (physical) distance of the rm to the closest multi-establishment
rm which used short-time work in 2008. Hence, we claim that the results that are summarized
now are causal.
First and foremost, short-time work has a clear positive impact on employment and survival
of rms facing the largest potential drop in their revenue, in particular when these rms are
highly levered. By contrast, short-time work has no e¤ect on employment and survival of the
other rms. As a result, about half of the short-time work users in 2009 benet from windfall
e¤ects since they received short-time work subsidies for jobs at no risk of being destroyed.
Nevertheless, short-time work saved jobs overall and also limited the drop in the total number
of hours worked. For every worker on short-time work, 0:2 jobs are saved and the total volume
of hours increases by 10% of her usual number of hours worked. Fully in line with our models
predictions, despite the windfall e¤ects mentioned above, the cost per saved job (i.e. the total
amount of subsidy needed to save a job) by short-time work in 2009 is estimated to be equal
to 7% of the average labor cost, hence very low when compared with other such employment
policies. Because the government saves about 25% of the average labor cost when a low-wage
individual moves from non-employment to employment,7 short-time work caused a reduction of
6Houseman et al. (2017) nd that lack of awareness of short-time work option is a major barrier to short-time
work take-up in the U.S. See Nevoux et al. (2017) for an analysis of the rm-to-rm di¤usion of short-time
work in France.
7See Cahuc et al. (2018) who show that this gure is relevant for France in 2009, i.e. the time period under
study.
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Figure 1: Proportion of short-time work employees
Sources: DADS (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope:  Mainland France excluding Corsica.  Market sectors excluding agriculture.  Establish-
ments using short-time work for economic reasons.
public expenditures in 2009. Moreover, we do not nd that short-time work mainly saved jobs
in structurally weak rms unable to recover after the recession. On the contrary, short-time
work allowed highly levered rms, likely to face credit constraints in times of collapsing nancial
markets, to engage in labor hoarding and recover rapidly in the aftermath of the Recession.
This suggests that short-time work, when limited in scope and duration, is e¤ective at saving
jobs during deep recessions.
Relation with previous literature: On the theoretical side, Burdett and Wright (1989) and
Van Audenrode (1994) have shown short-time work to be favorable to employment at the cost
of distorting downwards the number of hours worked per employee, to improve welfare by mit-
igating those distortions caused by public unemployment insurance (Braun and Bruegemann,
2017), and to be welfare-improving when rms do not fully insure employees against income
shocks (Niedermayer and Tilly, 2017). Cooper et al. (2017) analyze short-time work in a ran-
dom search and matching model with multi-worker rms. They show that short-time work
deteriorates the allocative e¢ ciency of the labor market, resulting in signicant output losses
because of a reduction in the vacancy lling rate. By introducing within-rms jobs heterogene-
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Figure 2: Hourly short-time work subsidy (top left), individual num-
ber of short-time work hours (top right), individual short-time work sub-
sidy (bottom left) and total short-time work subsidy (bottom right)
Sources: DADS (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope:  Mainland France excluding Corsica.  Market sectors excluding agriculture.  Establish-
ments using short-time work for economic reasons.
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ity and capital market imperfections, features absent from Cooper et al. but central to our
analysis, our directed search and matching model (also with multi-worker rms) brings two
contributions. First, short-time work sustains employment at low cost when compared with
either wage or hiring subsidies because short-time work more e¤ectively targets jobs at risk of
being destroyed. Second, short time work can prevent ine¢ cient job destructions (within those
credit-constrained rms faced with large drops in revenue).
On the empirical side, macroeconomic evaluations, using cross-country data,8 or cross-
state data in the U.S.9 have generally identied a positive impact on employment. Their
conclusions are mostly drawn from a small number of observations, limiting their identication
ability. Microeconomic evaluations are scarce and mostly use rm-level sources in Germany or
in France. In Germany, all analyses rely on the IAB Establishment Panel, an annual survey with
approximately 16,000 rms, representing 1% of all rms and 7% of all employees, interrogated
in 2003, 2006 and 2009. Resulting estimates depend heavily on the method used to correct
for selection into short-time work, with no obvious lesson.10 The main reason for the lack of
consensus on the impact of short-time work in Germany seems to be the inadequacy of data
to deal with the selection-into-the-program problem. This literature analyzes the impact of
short-time work on employment by running regressions where employment growth is explained
by short-time work use and by a set of control variables including the revenue growth of the
rm. But it has long been acknowledged that the correlation between employment and revenue
is very weak overall and heterogeneous across rms. To avoid bias induced by selection of
rms with specic adjustment of employment into short-time work, this literature uses, in line
with Boeri and Bruecker (2011), the prior experience of rms with the program when trying to
instrument short-time work. As stressed by Bellmann et al. (2015), this is questionable since
empirical evidence shows that rms which use short-time work tend to adjust employment
more strongly when output falls than rms which do not use short-time work. This behavior of
short-time work users may result from technical constraints: rms have more incentives to use
short-time work if their production process implies that it is more costly to store production
8Boeri and Bruecker (2011), Brey and Hertweck (2016), Cahuc and Carcillo (2011), Hijzen and Martin
(2013), Hijzen and Venn (2011), Van Audenrode (1994).
9Abraham and Houseman (1994).
10Balleer et al. (2016), Boeri and Bruecker (2011), Niedermayer and Tilly (2017) nd positive e¤ects of
short-time work on employment. Bellmann and Gerner (2011), Bellmann et al. (2015), Kruppe and Scholz
(2014) nd no e¤ects of short-time work on employment.
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or to nd productive activities for incumbent employees when demand drops. Hence, it is
not surprising to see no positive e¤ects of short-time work on employment if the selection of
rms into the program is not properly accounted for. Instrumenting program use with prior
experience does not fully solve this selection issue and is likely to lead to underestimating the
potential positive impact of short-time work on employment. Indeed, most contributions using
this instrument nd no positive e¤ect on employment. In France, Calavrezo et al. (2010) face a
similar di¢ culty. The data are more extensive, since they use administrative data covering the
universe of French establishments over the period 2000-2005. Selection into short-time work
is modelled using propensity score matching. Their results tend to show that establishments
authorized to use short-time work are more likely to go bankrupt. The richness of our data
allows us to overcome the main di¢ culties encountered by these studies by relying on the
départemental heterogeneity in the 2008 response time to short-time work applications and
on the rm-to-rm di¤usion of the program to identify the causal and heterogeneous e¤ects
of short-time work. The benecial e¤ects are shown to be particularly strong for rms facing
deteriorated protability and nances which have been able to engage in labor hoarding and
recover rapidly in the aftermath of the Recession thanks to short-time work.11 This nding
must be set in relation to the recent evidence contained in Giroud and Mueller (2017) who
suggest that nancial constraints impaired rmsability to engage in labor hoarding during the
same Great Recession in the U.S.
The next Section presents the short-time work policy. Then, principles of the model are
given in Section 3 (proofs are relegated to a Model Appendix). The data sources are detailed
in Section 4. The identication strategy is explained in Section 5 and the estimation results are
presented in Section 6. Lessons are drawn in Section 7, our conclusion.
2 The Policy
The regulations of short-time work have changed multiple times since the inception of the
policy, in 1951. In the following, we present the rules prevailing in 2009.
All private establishments located in France and all their employees are eligible for short-
time work. There are six potential valid motives when asking for short-time work: (i) economic
situation; (ii) modernization, restructuring and transformation; (iii) problems in the provision of
11See Biddle (2014) for a discussion of the e¢ ciency of labor hoarding.
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raw materials; (iv) accident; (v) exceptionally adverse weather conditions; (vi) other exceptional
circumstances. Our paper will restrict the focus to the rst such motive.
When applying for short-time work, an establishment must specify the extent of its appli-
cation; i.e. either a part or the totality of the establishment; either a reduction or a temporary
suspension of activity. Then, short-time work applies to hours unworked below the weekly legal
duration (35 hours, or below the weekly collectively-agreed or contractual duration when it is
below 35 hours). The yearly number of subsidized hours per employee and per year cannot
exceed 800 (1,000 hours in the industries most severely hit by the great recession; in particular
the textile and automobile industries). For any employee, periods of short-time work cannot
exceed 6 consecutive months (and 6 weeks in the case of total suspension of activity). Otherwise,
she becomes unemployed, even though her contract still holds.
Under short-time work, each hour worked is paid using the employees previous gross hourly
wage as a reference. The short-time work benet amounts to 60% of this reference, with a lower
limit of 6.84e, corresponding to 78% of the minimum wage. The monthly sum of the wage and
of the benet cannot be inferior to the monthly minimum wage and cannot exceed the reference
wage. The benets are paid the same way as wages are paid in France, i.e. on a monthly basis
by the establishment. The establishment is then reimbursed by the State. It receives a subsidy
of 3.84e per hour and per employee in establishments within rms with 250 employees or less,
and of 3.33e per hour and per employee for establishments within rms with 251 employees or
more.
To be allowed to benet from short-time work, the establishment initiates a procedure which
includes three steps: application, examination, and consumption. First, the establishment
and its works council discuss the possibility of using short-time work and at the end of this
consultation, the works council issues a written recommendation. The establishment lls out the
short-time work application form (including the establishment identication number, industry,
type, contact details, number of employees) as well as the short-time work demand (area, reason,
period, number of covered employees, number of hours and corresponding level of subsidies).
Then, the establishment sends the form with the recommendation together with a document
proving its economic di¢ culties to the Local (département level) Agency in charge of Labor
Relations (DIRECCTE), who are the public authorities in charge of managing short-time work
in the département.
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Second, the local public authority examines the short-time work application, most particu-
larly its validity. The DIRECCTE may ask the labor inspection authority to examine the exact
situation of this establishment. Then, it decides whether to reject or grant the application (in
which case it species the authorization period, the number of covered employees, number of
hours, and the corresponding level of subsidies) and informs the establishment of its decision.
Third, when the application is granted, the establishment may use short-time work within
the limits set by the local authority. In case it is used, the establishment sends the local author-
ity a reimbursement form (including the number of employees and hours that e¤ectively used
short-time work during the month, and the corresponding level of short-time work subsidies).
Once received, the local authority checks the validity of the request and pays the establishment
the corresponding sum.
As stressed above, the large expansion in short-time work at the start of the great recession,
displayed in Figure 1, resulted from a deliberate e¤ort of public decision-makers who enacted
laws, expanded the budget, and released circulars and directives to boost short-time work
usage. In December 2008, the maximal number of short-time work hours per employee per year
increased from 600 to 800; the maximal short-time work duration in case of total suspension
of activity was expanded from 4 to 6 weeks. In January 2009, the per-hour employee benet
increased from 50 to 60% of the previous gross hourly wage. Simultaneously, the subsidy received
by the establishment was expanded.12 In May 2009, long-term short-time work was created. An
establishment was allowed to use long-term short-time work for support with minimum length
of 3 months up to a maximum of 12 months. Under long-term short-time work, the per-hour
employee benet was set to 75% of the previous gross hourly wage. The establishment received
an additional subsidy, jointly nanced by the State and the unemployment insurance system.13
Furthermore, several ministerial circulars and directives were sent to local authorities, calling
for an easier access to the policy. In particular, local authorities were asked to interpret the
eligibility conditions in a exible way, resulting in an increased acceptance of applications.
Indeed, during the great recession, the fraction of applications rejected by the DIRECCTE
declined by a factor of 2, as shown by Figure 3.
12The subsidy received by the establishment increased from 2.44 to 3.84e for those belonging to rms with
250 employees or less, and from 2.13 to 3.33e for those belonging to rms with 251 employees or more.
13On top of the standardsubsidy, the state pays 1.90e per hour up to the 50th long-term short-time work
hour of a given employee and the unemployment insurance system pays 3.90e beyond the 50th hour.
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Figure 3: Short-time work refusal rate.
Sources: DADS (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope:  Mainland France excluding Corsica.  Market sectors exclud-
ing agriculture.  Establishments using short-time work for economic reasons.
Denition: Short-time work refusal rate is dened as the number of short-time work applications that
are refused divided by the total number of short-time work applications.
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After 2009, the policy experienced no major change until 2012.14 However, in response
to a second economic slowdown and to the associated requests formulated by businessesand
workersunions, reforms were implemented in March 2012, again expanding access to short-time
work.
3 Model
This section presents a model allowing us to understand why short-time work works and, more
to the point, why it has a precisely targeted impact on hours worked and employment in times
of recession.
3.1 Framework
The framework is a one-period static directed search and matching model with multi-worker
rms and endogenous job destruction.15 There are two goods: labor and a nal output produced
with labor only. There is a large number of rms and a large number of workers. All workers
are unemployed and all rms have zero employees at the start of the period. The preferences
of workers are represented by the utility function c (h); where c stands for the consumption
of the nal output and h for the number of hours worked.  is an increasing, convex and twice
continuously derivable function. Each rm can create v job vacancies at an increasing and
convex cost C(v). These job vacancies and unemployed workers are matched together according
to a constant returns to scale matching function, M(u; v); strictly increasing with respect to
the u unemployed workers and the v vacant jobs within the rms labor pool. In consequence,
the probability to ll a vacancy and to nd a job is respectively equal to m() = M(1=; 1)
and m(), where  = v=u is the labor market tightness of the labor pool of the rm. Workers
mobility between labor pools is perfect. Job seekers are assumed to have perfect information
on each labor pool and their search activity to be directed towards their preferred one.
The output per lled job is equal to the product of two independent random variables,
z and ". z is rm-specic and " is job-specic. Their realization is discovered by rms and
workers once the jobs have been lled. The distribution of " is identical in all rms. The
14The only change over this period was the increase in the maximal number of short-time work hours per
employee per year from 800 to 1,000 hours, in 2010.
15See Moene (1997) for the seminal directed search model and Kaas and Kircher (2015) for a directed search
model with multi-worker rms.
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cumulative distribution function of output per worker, y = z"; denoted by G(y) = Pr [z" < y] ;
is continuously di¤erentiable on its support [ymin;1). In this framework, rms are ex-ante
identical, but ex-post heterogeneous.
Each vacancy is linked to a non-renegotiable contract posted by the rm, which stipulates
the wage w(y), the hours worked h(y) contingent on the realization of productivity y, and 

is the set of productivity draws for which the job is not destroyed. When a match between a
job seeker and a vacancy occurs, the contract is signed. Then, the realizations of z and " are
observed and the contract is implemented.
In this set-up, short-time work allows rms and employees to receive subsidies to compensate
for the hours not worked when hours worked are below a threshold h: The short-time work
subsidy depends on hours worked rather than productivity y which cannot be observed by public
authorities. Subsidies per employee are equal to max(h h; 0): Short-time work subsidies are
nanced by a lump sum tax paid by rms.16
3.2 Labor Market Equilibrium
The hypothesis of directed search by workers and perfect mobility between pools implies that
the expected utility of a job seeker, Wu; is equal across labor pools. Hence, the expected utility
Wu of a person in search of work, the expected utility of an employee in any labor pool, denoted
by W; and the associated labor market tightness  satisfy the no-arbitrage condition:17
Wu = m()W + [1  m()] [b  (0)] ;8(;W ); (1)
where b denotes the gains of an unemployed person and where
W =
Z
y2


w(y) + max

h  h(y); 0  (h(y))dG(y) + Z
y=2

[b  (0)] dG(y): (2)
The no-arbitrage condition (1) denes a relation between the expected utility W linked to
the contract posted by each rm and the labor market tightness in its labor pool. In this
equation, Wu; the expected utility of unemployed workers, is considered as given by each rm.
16Since the values of z and " are discovered once the jobs have been created, the expected lump sum tax is
identical for each rm, implying that the amount of subsidies has no impact on job creation when it is nanced
with the lump sum tax. This assumption, made for the sake of simplicity, allows us to isolate the impact of
short-time work on job destruction.
17The labor market tightness  and the expected utility W are labor pool specic. Indexes for labor pools
are not used to save on notation.
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Di¤erentiation of the no-arbitrage condition shows that the relation between the expected utility
linked to the contract o¤ered by the rm and the labor market tightness in its labor pool is
negative:
d
dW
=   
(1  ) [W   b+ (0)] < 0; (3)
where  =  m0()=m() 2 (0; 1) is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to
unemployment. Equation (3) means that labor pools that o¤er better labor contracts also have
lower labor market tightness, and more job seekers. Equation (3) also shows that tightness
reacts more to changes in the contracts expected utility when the elasticity  of the matching
function w.r.t. unemployment is larger.
Each rm solves the maximization program:
max
v;w(y);
;h(y)0
vm()  C(v); (4)
where  satises equation (1), and where
 =
Z
y2


yh(y)  w(y) + max h  h(y); 0dG(y); (5)
is the expected value of a lled job.
In this framework (see Appendix A.1 for the solution), the number of vacant jobs is deter-
mined by equalizing their marginal costs to their marginal returns:
C 0(v) = m(); (6)
and the optimal labor contracts have the following properties. First, the expected utility of
employees increases with the expected prot generated by lled jobs:
W   [b  (0)] = 
1  : (7)
Second, each employee is laid o¤ if the productivity falls below a threshold denoted by ~y, and,
nally, the number of hours of work, h(y), increases with productivity y.
3.3 The E¤ect of Short-Time Work on Hours Worked and Employ-
ment
The e¤ect of short-time work on hours worked can be analyzed from the relation h(y) between
hours worked and productivity, as stipulated in the equilibrium labor contract. Figure 4 displays
13
the relation between the number of hours worked and productivity with short-time work ( > 0)
and without short-time work ( = 0).
In the presence of short-time work, the number of hours worked drops below the threshold
level of hours h under which hours not worked can be subsidized. Short-time work reduces
the number of hours worked over the interval [~y; y), where ~y denotes the threshold value of
productivity below which jobs are destroyed absent short-time work. The drop in hours worked
increases with the subsidy : However, short-time work also diminishes the number of layo¤s,
since the threshold value of productivity below which jobs are destroyed is lowered by short-
time work. Figure 4 displays a situation in which there are layo¤s since the threshold level of
productivity below which jobs are destroyed, denoted ~y1 when the rm uses short-time work, is
strictly positive. Nevertheless, it is possible to have situations without layo¤, if the amount of
short-time work subsidy at zero hours worked, equal to h; is bigger than the unemployment
benet b: Hence, it can be optimal to keep jobs with zero hours worked if the short-time work
subsidy  is large enough.18
All in all, short-time work can signicantly reduce job destruction in rms facing bad re-
alizations of their rm-specic productivity shock z; i.e. when many jobs are at risk of being
destroyed (i.e. y = z  " < ~y). This result is illustrated on the bottom part of Figure 5 which
displays the situation of a low-productivity rm, for which the probability that the productivity
lies below the reservation value ~y below which jobs are destroyed in the absence of short-time
work is high. Absent short-time work, this rm destroys all jobs with productivity below ~y:
Short-time work saves all jobs of specic productivity y 2 [~y1; ~y); all surviving jobs of pro-
ductivity y < y use short-time work. Short-time work has a clear and signicant impact on
employment in a low-productivity rm. For the worse realizations of the rm-specic produc-
tivity shock z; some rms may have no protable job absent short-time work, meaning that
short-time compensation may help them survive. However, the situation is very di¤erent in a
medium-productivity rm, displayed in the middle graph of Figure 5, where a large share of jobs
use short-work but where short-time work saves very few jobs. The main impact of short-time
work is to reduce the number of hours worked with very little e¤ect on employment. As for a
high-productivity rm, case displayed in the upper graph of Figure 5, the probability of using
short-time work is very small because the probability that y nds itself below y is very small.19
18see Appendix A.1.
19It can be easily checked that a random search model with bargaining on wages and hours worked or a model
14
0hH
ou
rs
 w
or
ke
d
0 y 1 y y y
-
-~~
Figure 4: The relation between productivity y and hours worked with short-time work (contin-
uous red line) and without short-time work (dashed black line).
Notes:  h stands for the threshold number of hours worked below which short-time work applies.  ~y stands
for the threshold value of productivity below which jobs are destroyed absent short-time work.  ~y1 stands for
the value of this threshold when there is short-time work.
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The mechanisms allowing short-time work to be more e¤ective during recessions, apart from
more frequent drops in productivity in such times, become transparent once the following (two)
points are made.
First, nancial constraints are typically more severe during recessions. Financial constraints
increase the costs of funding capital and labor services. To see their impact simply, let us assume
that each job has a continuation value, at the end of the period, normalized to zero when there
is no nancial constraint the situation under scrutiny until now and negative when there
are nancial constraints. In this framework, the expected prot  of each job is reduced by the
amount c  0, which stands for the costs induced by nancial constraints. It is easy to check,
from equation (6), that these costs reduce job creation. They also increase job destruction
because they decrease the option value of jobs.20 This result is consistent with the empirical
ndings of Giroud and Mueller (2017) who show that nancial constraints impaired rms
ability to engage in labor hoarding during the Great Recession in the United-States. In this
context it is clear, from Figure 6, that nancial constraints, which shift ~y to the right, imply
that short-time work saves more jobs in rms that face more stringent nancial constraints, for
given level of productivity. Financial constraints can also a¤ect productivity negatively, through
their negative impact on investment.21 In this case, nancial constraints shift the productivity
distributions to the left (without moving the threshold ~y) on Figure 6, which entails higher
short-time work take-up and more jobs saved by short-time work.
Second, an important disadvantage of short-time work is its negative impact on hours
worked. However, short-time work can increase the total number of hours worked through
its positive e¤ect on employment. This situation arises if the reservation productivity, ~y; lies
in a region where the slope of the density of the distribution of productivity y is negative.22
For standard distributions, with a single mode, this means that the reservation productivity
of collective bargaining where utilitarian trade-unions bargain wages and hours worked at the rm level would
yield the same qualitative results.
20Notice that c raises the reservation productivity ~y without changing the shape of the relation between
productivity and hours worked h(y). More precisely, the job surplus s(y) dened equation (A3) in Appendix
A.1 is reduced by c which implies that h(y); dened by equation (A4), does not depend on c: The reservation
productivity ~y = fyjs(y) = 0g increases with c:
21According to empirical studies, exogenous credit ratings downwards which reduce access to credit have
negative impact on investment, especially for rms that have large nancial needs to fund their investment,
Almeida et al. (2017), Derien et al. (2016). Giroud and Mueller (2017) also nd that more levered rms raise
less debt and cut back more on investment during the Great Recession in the United States.
22See Appendix A.3.
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Figure 5: The e¤ects of short-time work according to the productivity of rms
Notes:  y stands for the threshold value of productivity y = " z below which short-time work is used  ~y
stands for the threshold value of productivity below which jobs are destroyed in the absence of short-time work.
 ~y1 stands for the threshold value of productivity below which jobs are destroyed when there is short-time
work.  " has a log-normal distribution with parameters (4; 0:2).  z = 1; 0:4; 0:15 for high, medium, low
productivity rm respectively.
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Figure 6: The e¤ects of nancial constraints on the reservation productivity ~y:
Note: This gure displays the impact of more stringent nancial constraints, which move the reservation
productivity ~y to the right, as shown by the green arrows.
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is above the mode (but possibly lower than the median and the mean if the distribution is
log-normal, for instance), as displayed in the bottom graph of Figure 5, which represents the
low-productivity rms case. Such situations are again more likely to arise during recessions when
negative aggregate shocks hit rms and when nancial constraints are more stringent. Hence,
short-time work is more likely to raise the total number of hours worked during recessions than
in normal times.
3.4 The Cost per Job Saved
Short-time work generates windfall gains for both workers and rms insofar as short-time
work is used by workers whose job would not have been destroyed in the absence of this policy.
However these windfall gains are smaller than for usual job subsidies policies which do not allow
the government to target e¤ectively low-productivity jobs, because short-time work provides
subsidies to jobs with productivity below y whereas wage subsidies or hiring subsidies provide
support to jobs independently of their productivity. Such subsidies are often conditional on
the type of worker, for instance when they target unskilled workers, low-wage workers, or the
long-term unemployed, or when they target specic rms, such as small rms; but subsidies
do not depend on the realization of a productivity shock, an outcome rarely veriable by the
government. By contrast, short-time work allows the government to target low-productivity
jobs because rms and workers choose to allocate fewer hours to these jobs and only these jobs.
Seen from this perspective, short-time work is a more e¤ective tool than job subsidies when the
aim is to sustain employment in recessions.
We show in Appendix A.2 that the ratio between the number of jobs saved by short-time
work and by job subsidies, respectively, for an identical cost per employee (or equivalently an
identical expenditure) is given by equation
Number of jobs saved by short-time work
Number of jobs saved by job subsidies
=
Nm()v [1 G(~y)]
Nm()v
R y
~y
h h(y)
h h(~y)dG(y)
(8)
where N denotes the number of rms in the economy. The numerator of the right hand side
term is the number of employees and the denominator is the weighted sum of employees using
short-time work, each of these employees being weighted by his number of short-time work
hours relative to the maximum number of short-time work hours per employee in the economy.
The ratio between the number of jobs saved by short-time work and the number of jobs saved
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by job subsidies is clearly larger than one, for two reasons. First, short-time work is used by a
fraction of employees, those who face large drops in productivity. Hence, job subsidies are paid
for all Nm()v [1 G(~y)] employees whereas short-time compensation is provided for a subset
Nm()v [G(y) G(~y)] ; where y the threshold value of productivity below which short-time
work is used is generally smaller than the highest productivity level. Second, short-time work
subsidizes non-worked hours only. Non-worked hours increase when productivity drops because
the number of hours worked increases with productivity. As a consequence, the sum of weights
h  h(y) = h  h(~y) in the integral of equation (8) is smaller than one, implying that the
denominator is smaller than Nm()v [G(y) G(~y)] :
Taken together, these two mechanisms imply that the cost per job saved by short-time work
is potentially much lower than the cost per job saved by job subsidies. In 2009, short-time work
was used by about 4% of employees (see Figure 1). Thus, according to equation (8), the cost
per job saved by short-time work should be about 25 times lower than the cost per job saved
by job subsidies (provided to all jobs). Obviously, job subsidies are also targeted either to
specic categories of workers (the low-skilled, say) or to specic categories of rms (often small
rms). But targeting subsidies on broad categories is not e¤ective at targeting jobs at risk of
being destroyed. From this perspective, our model stresses that the cost per job saved/created
by short-time work is potentially much smaller than the cost per job saved/created using job
subsidies.
4 Data
In order to assess the e¤ect of short-time work on survival, employment, and hours worked in
French establishments, we merge several data sources.
4.1 Data Sources
4.1.1 Sinapse-Chômage Partiel
To measure short-time work in all its components, administrative and economic, we use Sinapse-
Chômage Partiel, a source produced by the Statistical Department of the French Labor Ministry
(DARES) in collaboration with the Employment and Vocational Training Agency (DGEFP).
Data were collected for the years 2007 to 2014 by the DIRECCTE. To do so, a software called
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Aglae-Chômage Partiel creates a record for each short-time work application received from an
establishment located in the département. The record allows information to be acquired at each
step of the short-time work application process. Then, two data sets are made out of these
applications. In one, all variables generated by the application process are included: applica-
tion identication number of the establishment,23 information on the applying establishment
(identication number, name, city, labor pool, département, région, industry, weekly legal and
collective work duration, number of employees); the nature of the reduction in hours (identica-
tion number, reason, area, repeated use, hourly short-time work subsidy, maximum number of
short-time work hours per employee and per year, works council recommendation, labor inspec-
tion recommendation, application date); authorized short-time work (decision status, decision
date, authorization period, number of authorized short-time work employees in total and by
occupation and work duration, number of authorized short-time work hours and the associated
amount of subsidies). In the second data set, variables on monthly consumption are included:
identication number, short-time work consumption month and its sequential number relative
to the rst month of the authorization period, number of monthly employees e¤ectively under
short-time work, number of short-time work consumed hours and the associated amount of
subsidies.
4.1.2 DADS-Établissements
The Déclaration Annuelle de Données Sociales (DADS) is produced by the French National
Institute for Statistical and Economic Studies (INSEE). Each establishment reports the gross
wage, inclusive of employer and employee-paid payroll taxes, and net wage for each of its em-
ployee, to the tax authority. INSEE then processes these variables to yield various aggregates,
at the individual, establishment, and rm levels. In what follows we use the establishment
version which allows us to measure the industry, the city, employment, hours, and the wage bill
for each establishment in our matched sample.
The DADS provides quite reliable information on employment and labor contract types.
However, information on hours worked is less precise inasmuch as about 20% of employees are
paid on a daily basis. Moreover, when the DADS information is not transmitted in the relevant
format through the automated Unied Social Data Reporting (DADS-U ) system, information
23Insofar as information is available at the establishment level, but not at the individual level, it is not possible
to idenfy the workers on short-time work.
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about the number of hours is absent, and the number of hours worked is imputed. Therefore,
the quality of information on hours is not su¢ cient to directly evaluate the impact of short-time
work on the hours worked.
4.1.3 FICUS and FARE
The INSEE -Section "Production of Annual FirmsStatistics" (ESANE) produces the so-called
FICUS (until 2007) and FARE (since 2008) data sets using the nancial and scal accounts
sent by all French rms to the scal authority. The variables are constructed using the annual
tax returns and other administrative sources based on these accounts. The above data sets
contain, among other things, the rm identication number and precise information about the
balance sheet.
4.1.4 Geo-coded Data
In order to precisely locate all French establishments, we use the Système dIdentication des
Entreprises et des Établissements (SIENE), the Système Informatique pour le Répertoire des
Entreprises et des Établissements (SIRENE) and the Système dIdentication au Répertoire
des Unités Statistiques (SIRUS). The SIENE, the SIRENE and the SIRUS are three admin-
istrative datasets produced by the INSEE which provide information about the geographic
location of all French establishments. Thanks to these four data sources, we create a unied
dataset containing the address, the zipcode and the city of all establishments that we geocode
using the software ArcGIS and matching with the BD ADRESSE (a dataset produced by the
French National Institute for Information about Geography and Forest (IGN ) and containing
all geocoded French addresses). This process generates the geographic coordinates of all es-
tablishments in the format Lambert 93 which enables us to compute the Euclidean distance
between establishments.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Using the rm (SIREN ) and the establishment identication number (SIRET ), we merge the
above data sources. Table 1 displays the characteristics of rms using short-time work for
economic reasons in 2009 and those of rms which do not use short-time work in the same
year. We restrict our attention to single-establishment rms essentially because accounts are
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only available at the rm level whereas the rest of our sources are establishment-level when
our theory needs a measure of the shock that hits the entity. We also concentrate on the
establishments using short-time work for the rst time in 2009, i.e. which did not use short-
time work in 2007 or 2008, to avoid establishments using short-time work repeatedly in order
to cope with the seasonal uctuations they face. As shown by Table 1, rms using short-time
work are older, have more employees, pay higher wages, have a lower share of temporary jobs
and a lower worker turnover; their employment growth rate and their revenue growth rate are
also lower. Leverage is slightly lower in rms using short-time work. However, the propensity
to use short-time work increases with leverage conditional on the sector and the age of the rm.
Conditional on these two variables, leverage is 4.3 percentage points higher (with standard
error equal to 0:002) in rms using short-time work. Table 2 shows that the short-time work
take-up varies widely across sectors. It is higher in manufacturing industries (6.4%) and to a
less extent in construction (1.1%) than in other sectors.
5 Empirical Strategy and Identication
Our model shows that the e¤ect of short-time work on employment depends on the shocks
a¤ecting the revenue of the rm: short-time work really savesjobs for those rms faced with
a large drop in revenue. Hence, we evaluate the impact of short-time work in 2009 in rm i by
estimating the following regression:
Li = 0 + STWi1 + Yi2 +Xi3 + "i (9)
where the dependent variable, Li, denotes the employment growth rate (employment corre-
sponds to the number of employees on the 31st of December). We also explore the e¤ects of
short-time work on the survival rate of rms (a rm survives in year t if and only if it has a
positive number of employees on the 31st of December of year t), on the share of permanent
jobs, on the growth rate of permanent jobs and on the growth rate of temporary jobs. STWi
is an indicator variable equal to one if the rm uses short-time work for economic reasons and
to zero otherwise. Yi denotes the revenue growth rate of rm i. Xi is a vector of control
variables,24 and "i is an error term.
24The control variables include past mean hourly wage, the past number of hours worked per employee, the
past job turnover, the past share of temporary jobs, the age of the rm, the leverage of the rm and (728)
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To estimate consistently equation (9), several identication issues must be resolved. First,
because short-time work also has an impact on the revenue growth rate Yi, we must deal with
a simultaneity problem. To do so, we predict the revenue growth rate of rm i by the leave-
one-out mean growth rate of revenues in the industry and commuting zone (Zone dEmploi),
denoted by Yi;25 as well as by its short-time work use:
Yi = b0 + STWib1 + Yib2 +Xib3 + "1i (10)
Second, and even more important, short-time work use is also likely to be correlated with
the error term "i of equation (9) because unobserved confounding variables can inuence em-
ployment growth, revenue growth, and short-time work take-up. In particular, rms have more
incentives to use short-time work if it is more costly to store production or to nd produc-
tive replacement activities for incumbent workers when the demand drops. This problem is
potentially magnied by the small and heterogeneous correlation between the rms revenue
growth rate and its employment growth rate. To understand why this is likely to induce biases
when estimating (9) by OLS, let us rst note that the (Pearson) correlation coe¢ cient between
the two variables is very small, equal to 0:07 in 2008. Furthermore, this coe¢ cient is also
heterogeneous across industries. To show this, consider Figure 7 that reports the take-up rate
of short-time work in 2009 (y-axis) and the correlation of the revenue growth rate with the
employment growth rate of the rm in 2008 (x-axis) by industry. This Figure demonstrates
the extreme heterogeneity across industries of the adjustment of employment to uctuations in
revenue. Industries where the correlation is large in 2008 tend to also have a larger short-time
work take-up in 2009. This result conrms that of Bellmann et al. (2015, p 196), who nd
that rms which use short-time work tend to adjust employment more strongly when output
falls than rms which do not use short-time work. Indeed, if rms using short-time work more
intensively are also those more likely to adjust employment downwards when their revenue
drops, the OLS estimates for short-time work in equation (9) are biased downwards.
In the following paragraphs, we present our instrumental variable strategy to deal with the
above problems.
industry xed e¤ects to control for potential sector-specic trends. We also include indicator variables to
account for regulations which may di¤erently inuence the adjustment of employment depending on the size of
the rm in the previous year (10, 50, 250, and 1,000 employees).
25Namely, we compute for each sector  commuting zone cell the revenue growth rate as Pj 6=i(Yj;2009  
Yj;2008)=Yj;2008 where Yj;t denotes revenue of rm j in year t belonging to the same sector and commuting zone
as rm i:
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Figure 7: Proportion of short-time work establishments in 2009 (vertical axis) and employment
revenue correlation coe¢ cient in 2008 (horizontal axis)
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope:  Mainland France excluding Corsica.  Market sectors excluding agriculture.
Denition: The employment revenue correlation coe¢ cient is dened as the correlation between the revenue
growth rate and the employment growth rate.
Notes:  The proportion of short-time work establishments and the employment revenue correlation coe¢ cient
are computed at the sector level.  The equation corresponding to the linear regression is: STWi = :040
(:004)
+
:066
(:021)
i, R
2 = :015 and N = 552 where i denotes the sector, STWi denotes the proportion of short-time
work establishments and i denotes the employment revenue correlation coe¢ cient.
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To construct our instruments, we rely on a detailed analysis of the administrative environ-
ment leading to the granting of short-time work subsidies. More precisely, we identify two main
channels explaining the short-time work take-up in 2009.
First, we analyze the role played by the response time of the local administration to rms
applications. The DIRECCTEs the départemental agencies in charge of labor relations play
a key role in administering the implementation of short-time work regulations. They are in
charge of processing the applications and the payment of short-time work subsidies. As will be
shown, this creates heterogeneity in the response time to short-time work applications across
départements. A long response time can be a signal of bad management. It may also reect
stringent adherence to requirements in granting short-time work subsidies, meaning that the
local administration takes a long time to examine the applications, to ask for complementary
documents proving the economic di¢ culties of the establishment, and to ask the labor inspection
authority to assess the exact situation of the establishment. Whatever its origin, good or bad
management, a long response time will negatively a¤ect short-time work use in bad times when
establishments need to react promptly to a sharp drop in their revenue. Figure 8 shows the
large amount of cross-sectional (across départements) variation in the 2008 response time to
short-time work applications, even though short-time work was barely in use then. The fraction
of response times above 14 workdays which corresponds to the median response time in 2008 
goes from 0% (in 10 départements) to 90% (in one département) when the same fraction in the
average département is equal to 38%. Although several ministerial circulars and directives were
sent to local authorities, calling for easier access to the policy in 2009, Figure 9 shows that the
départements where the response time was longer in 2008 are also those that still had a longer
response time in 2009. Therefore, rms could anticipate that, even during the Great Recession,
accessing short-time work in some specic and known départements would be di¢ cult.
Figure 10 indeed clearly shows that there is a negative correlation between the response
time of the départemental administration and the short-time work take-up before the Recession,
in 2008. This relation holds even controlling for a large set of potential confounding factors,
including (728) sector xed-e¤ects and the average départemental employment growth to ensure
that this relation is not driven by congestion e¤ects induced by di¤erences in départemental
employment growth. Figure 10 displays a strong negative relation between the short-time work
take-up rate in 2009 and the response time of the départemental administration in 2008. The
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Figure 8: Number of départements (vertical axis) and proportion of short-time work applica-
tions whose response time is longer than 14 days (horizontal axis) in 2008
Source: Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope:  Mainland France excluding Corsica.  Market sectors excluding agriculture.  Establishments using
short-time work.
Denition: Response time is dened as the number of workdays elapsed between the receipt date and the
decision date regarding the short-time work application.
Reading: 27 départements had 20% of short-time work applications whose response time is longer than 14
days in 2008.
short-time work take-up rates in 2009 are twice as high as in the départements belonging to
the lowest ventile (bottom ve centiles) of our measure of response time in 2008 as in those
belonging to the highest ventile (top ve centiles).
Second, we analyze the di¤usion mechanism across establishments of short-time work
applications. It emerges that applications to the policy made by multi-establishment rm are
related to, potentially even caused by, the response time of the départemental administration
just studied. Table 3 shows that multi-establishment rms used short-time work more frequently
in 2008, before the Recession, in their establishments located in the départements where the
response time was shorter in the same year. This result holds conditional on a large set of es-
tablishment characteristics including the average hourly wage, the share of temporary jobs, the
average number of annual hours worked per worker, the revenue growth in the commuting zone,
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Figure 9: Proportion of short-time work applications whose response time is longer than 14
days in 2009 (vertical axis) and in 2008 (horizontal axis)
Source: Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope:  Mainland France excluding Corsica.  Market sectors excluding agriculture.  Establishments using
short-time work.
Denition: Response time is dened as the number of workdays elapsed between the receipt date and the
decision date regarding the short-time work application.
Notes:  The proportion of short-time work applications whose response time is longer than 14 days is computed
at the département level.  The equation corresponding to the linear regression is: yi = 20
(3:7)
+ :058
(:09)
xi,
AdjR2 = :27 and N = 94 where i denotes the département, yi denotes the proportion of short-time work
applications whose response time is longer than 14 days in 2009 and xi denotes the proportion of short-time
work applications whose response time is longer than 14 days in 2008.
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Figure 10: Proportion of short-time work establishments in 2008 (left) and in 2009 (right)
(vertical axis) and proportion of short-time work applications whose response time is longer
than 14 days in 2008 (horizontal axis)
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope:  Mainland France excluding Corsica.  Market sectors excluding agriculture.
Notes:  Each graph represents a binscatter which groups the variable on the horizontal axis into equal-sized
bins, computes the mean of the variables on the horizontal and vertical axes within each bin, and creates a
scatterplot of these data points.  Top graphs report the mean of the short-time work take-up rates whereas
the bottom graphs report the mean conditional on the revenue growth rate, the leverage rate, the hourly gross
wage, the number of hours worked per worker, the turnover rate, the share of temporary jobs, the number of
employees, the age of the rm and (728) sector-specic xed e¤ects, départemental employment growth.
Denitions:  Response time is dened as the number of days elapsed between the receipt date and the
decision date regarding the short-time work application.  The revenue growth rate is dened as the di¤erence
in the revenue between 2009 (respectively 2008) and 2008 (respectively 2007), divided by the absolute value of
the revenue in 2008 (respectively 2007).  The leverage rate is dened as the level of debt divided by the level
of assets, in the previous year.  The hourly gross wage is dened as the total labor cost divided by the total
number of hours worked, in the previous year.  The number of hours worked per worker is dened as the total
number of hours worked divided by the average number of employees, in the previous year.  The turnover rate
is dened as the total number of employees divided by the average number of employees, in the previous year.
 The share of temporary jobs is dened as the number of employees under non-permanent contracts divided
by the total number of employees, in the previous year.  The number of employees is dened as an indicator
variable of the number of employees on the 31st of December of the previous year (10, 50, 250, and 1,000 employ-
ees).  The age is dened as the di¤erence between 2009 (respectively 2008) and the year of creation of the rm.
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and industry xed e¤ects. Indeed, the information transmission mechanism across establish-
ments is likely to be very di¤erent for single and multi-establishment rms: multi-establishment
rms may be presumed to rely pretty heavily on within-rm between-establishments informa-
tion from their own (rm-level) human resources departments as well as direct ows between
establishments. As for single-establishment rms, the analysis follows.
Let us see how the behavior of single-establishment rms in 2009 is inuenced by the past
response time of the local administration and by the 2008 choices of geographically neighboring
establishments belonging to a multi-establishment rm. To do this, we study the following
equation which models the decision of a rm i which did not use short-time work in 2007 or
in 2008 to use short-time work in 2009:26
STWi = a0 +RPia1 +DMia2 + Yia3 +Xia4 + i (11)
where RPi denotes the share of response time to short-time work applications longer than 14
workdays of the départemental administration of rm i in 2008; DMi stands for the distance to
the closest establishment, belonging to a multi-establishment rm, which used short-time work
in 2008. Equation (11) states that the short-time work take-up of rm i depends on these two
variables, on the leave-one-out revenue mean growth rate of the industry  commuting zone cell
of rm i, and on the other variables Xi likely to inuence employment growth in equation (9).
Table 5 shows that the short-time work use of single-establishment rms in 2009 is negatively
correlated with the response time of the départemental administration in 2008 and with the
distance to the closest establishment, belonging to a multi-establishment rm, which used short
time work in 2008.
Hence, the impact of the response time of the départemental administration on the short-
time work use of single-establishment rms is amplied by multi-establishment rms, whose
choice of using short-time work more intensively in départements with shorter response times
di¤uses to single-establishment rms. This phenomenon is illustrated on Figure 11 which dis-
plays the di¤usion of short-time work in two départements, Savoie and Rhône, from December
2008 to December 2009, among rms belonging to the industrial mechanics industry. The red
squares of the rst map represent the establishments belonging to multi-establishment rms
applying for short-time work in December 2008. The green diamonds of the second map add
26Henceforth, rms which used short-time work in 2007 or 2008 are excluded from the sample to avoid repeat
users who have previously beneted from the treatment.
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the single-establishment rms operating in 2008. The blue triangles of the third map add the
single-establishment rms applying for the rst time for short-time work for economic reasons
between the 1st and the 15th of January 2009, and so on. As time goes by, some green dia-
monds located close to the red squares progressively turn into blue triangles, highlighting the
spatial di¤usion of short-time work use from multi-establishment rms to single-establishment
ones. Hence, short-time work clearly spreads to single-establishment rms located close to es-
tablishments belonging to multi-establishment rms which applied for short-time work in 2008.
The di¤usion is more intense in Rhône in which the response time of the administration is
shorter (15% of response times are longer than 14 workdays, versus 24% in Savoie). Although
not displayed here, this result is not specic to the sector of industrial mechanics nor to these
départements but holds for all manufacturing rms. Obviously, this Figure is only illustrative
insofar as the geographical spread of short-time work may be inuenced by confounding vari-
ables. To shed more light on the di¤usion process, we analyze the relation between the date of
short-time work take-up of single establishment rms in 2009 and their distance to establish-
ments belonging to multi-establishment rms which used short-time work in 2008. We group
the single establishment rms by quartiles of distance to establishments belonging to multi-
establishment rms which used short-time work in 2008. Since the short-time work take-up is
concentrated at the beginning of 2009,27 we look at whether single establishment rms located
closer to establishments belonging to multi-establishment rms which used short-time work in
2008 use short-time work more frequently in the rst quarter of 2009 than later in the same
year. Table 4 shows that the probability that single establishment rms which belong to the rst
quartile28 use short-time work in the rst quarter of 2009 is 5 percentage points higher relative
to single establishment rms which belong to the other quartiles. This relation is robust to the
inclusion of many potential confounding variables including the revenue growth rate of the rm
in 2009, the quarterly employment growth rate of its sector (accounting for 728 sectors) and
the départemental response time.
These results conrm that short-time work take-up di¤uses from rm-to-rm, even though
the details are unknown. The di¤usion may arise from the transmission of information. It may
27The share of single establishment rms using short-time work in the rst, second, third and fourth quarter
of 2009 is 0.45, 0.27, 0.13 and 0.15 respectively.
28The average distance in the rst quartile is equal to 1.1 kilometers and the maximum distance in this
quartile is 2.2 kilometers.
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Figure 11: The di¤usion of short-time work in Rhône (left-hand side département on each map)
and Savoie (right-hand side département on each map) from December 2008 to December 2009
Sources: DADS (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope:  Départements of Rhône and Savoie (belonging to the same région Rhône-Alpes and separated by the
département of Isère).  Sector of industrial mechanics.
Notes:  The red squares stand for the establishments, belonging to a multi-establishment rm, which applied
for short-time work in December 2008.  The blue triangles stand for the establishments, belonging to a single-
establishment rm, which applied for the rst time for short-time work for economic reasons between the 1st
of January 2009 and the 15th of January 2009 (map 3, i.e. rst row, third column), between the 1st of January
2009 and the 31st of January 2009 (map 4, i.e. second row, rst column), between the 1st of January 2009
and the 15th of February 2009 (map 5), between the 1st of January 2009 and the 28th of February 2009 (map
6), between January 2009 and May 2009 (map 7), between January 2009 and October 2009 (map 8), between
January 2009 and December 2009 (map 9).  The green diamonds stand for the establishments, belonging to
a single-establishment rm and operating in 2009.
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also arise from a reluctance to be the only establishment to apply, whereas some coordination
may reduce the potential negative signal associated with a short-time work application for the
rms employees, its trading partners, and its creditors, as such an application makes known
the nancial di¢ culties a rm is facing.
Hence, the 2009 short-time work use is correlated with two variables that are very unlikely to
have an impact on how the rm adjusts employment when its demand falls: the 2008 response
time of the départemental administration to short-time work applications and the distance to
the closest establishment, belonging to a multi-establishment rm, which used short-time work
in 2008. Therefore, these two variables are used as instruments for short-time work. Equations
(10) and (11) imply that short-time work use and the revenue growth rate are explained by
equations
STWi = 0 +RPi1 +DMi2 + Yi3 +Xi4 + i (12)
Yi = 0 +RPi1 +DMi2 + Yi3 +Xi4 + i (13)
Assuming that the error term of equation (9) is correlated neither with the response time
to short-time work applications of the départemental administration of rm i in 2008 nor with
the distance to the closest establishment, belonging to a multi-establishment rm, which used
short time work in 2008, nor with the revenue growth rate in the industry and commuting zone,
as well as the other exogenous variables (i.e. E
 
"ijRPi; DMi; Y i; Xi

= 0), equation (9) can be
consistently estimated by two-stage least squares, using RPi; DMi and Yi as instruments for
the rms decision to take up short-time work and for its revenue growth rate.
The estimates of the rst-stage equations (12) and (13) presented in Table 5 show that short-
time work used in 2009 is strongly correlated with the instruments. Besides these instruments,
several features of the rms exert an inuence on short-time work use. Firms with higher labor
turnover and a higher share of temporary contracts in 2008 used short-time work less frequently
in 2009. It is likely that these rms had less need to rely on short-time work when they were
hit by negative shocks on their revenue because they could adjust labor rapidly and at a lower
cost. Larger rms, rms with higher leverage, and rms in which the average number of annual
hours of work was higher in 2008 used short-time work more frequently in 2009.
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6 E¤ects of Short-Time Work
We start by analyzing the global rm-level impact of short-time work before looking at hetero-
geneous e¤ects. This heterogeneity is measured by the magnitude of the fall in revenues during
the Great Recession, as suggested by our model. Then, we use our results to compute the cost
per job saved by the short-time work policy.
6.1 Global E¤ects
Table 6, rows 1 and 2, presents the impact of short-time work on employment growth and on
the death of rms in 2009. Column (OLS) shows that the ordinary least squares estimate of
short-time work from equation (9) is negative and strongly signicant for employment growth.
This result conrms our previous discussion: rms using short-time work have less opportunity
to smooth the activities of their employees and to store production when their demand falls.
As a result, those rms, also more likely to use this scheme, have a greater propensity to lay o¤
their employees. Hence, the negative sign and the strong signicance of the estimate suggest
that the ordinary least squares estimates are strongly biased downwards.
The instrumental variables estimates of the impact of short-time work on employment,
presented in Table 6, column (IV), are very di¤erent from those obtained by ordinary least
squares. The IV estimate of the impact of short-time work on employment growth is positive
and not signicantly di¤erent from zero. However, short-time work has a positive impact on
the share of permanent jobs, suggesting that short-time work makes it easier to keep employees
with permanent contracts, as their labor services can be adjusted at the intensive margin. The
above IV result that short-time work has no (causal) statistically signicant e¤ect on aggregate
employment should not surprise us: our theoretical framework has clearly demonstrated that
the e¤ect of short-time work on employment is, by design, heterogeneous, with no e¤ect for
rms which faced a small drop in their revenue but a potentially large and positive e¤ect for
those rms that faced a large fall in revenues.
6.2 Heterogeneous E¤ects
To highlight our models predictions short-time work has heterogeneous e¤ects across rms,
depending on the magnitude of the shock that hits them, with jobs saved only in rms hit by
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a very negative shock we stratify the rms in quintiles according to their (predicted) revenue
growth rate in 2009, as estimated using equation (13).29
Table 7 shows that short-time work is concentrated in the (rst) quintile of rms with the
lowest predicted revenue growth rate. There, the take-up is three times larger than in the
second quintile and 6.5 times larger than in the fth quintile. Nevertheless, 47% of those rms
using short-time work do not belong to the rst quintile. This rst quintile mostly comprises
larger and older rms (see Table 8).
6.2.1 Heterogeneous E¤ects in 2009
To assess how short-time work a¤ects rms faced with di¤erent economic shocks, Tables 9
and 10 report both the rst and the second stages of our instrumental variables estimation of
equation (9), for each quintile of the predicted revenue growth rate of rms.
The estimates for the rst stage reported in Table 9 show that the instruments are jointly
signicant at every quintile. In line with the model (see Figure 5), rms belonging to the bot-
tom quintiles, for which the demand for short-time work is stronger, are more sensitive to the
response time of the administration. Results in Table 10 show that the estimated second-stage
coe¢ cients are signicantly di¤erent from zero for both the growth of employment and the
growth of permanent jobs only within the lowest quintile of predicted revenue growth. In all
other quintiles, estimated coe¢ cients are never signicantly di¤erent from zero and their mag-
nitude decreases with the predicted revenue growth. More precisely, short-time work raises
employment growth by about 16 percentage points in the rst quintile with a 95% con-
dence interval equal to [6%; 26%], which corresponds to one half of the standard deviation of
employment growth in that quintile. As rms belonging to this rst quintile are much larger
than other rms, short-time work saved about 11% of jobs of all rms which used short-time
work with a 95% condence interval equal to [4%; 18%].30 This implies that every worker
29In this equation, the revenue growth rate of each rm is explained by the leave-one-out revenue growth rate
of its industry  commuting zone cell, industry xed-e¤ects to control for potential industry-specic trends,
and several rm-specic variables including the past share of temporary jobs, the past mean hourly wage, the
past number of hours worked per employee, the past labor turnover, the past rm leverage, and the age of the
rm.
30Let us denote by E (`i) =`i the expected employment growth rate in rm i; where `i denotes employment
in rm i on 31 December 2008. According to equation (9), the impact of short-time work on the expected
employment change in rm i is E (`i) = ^1`i: Therefore, total employment change in the rst quintile is equal
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on short-time induces 0:17 saved job on average31 with a 95% condence interval equal to
[0:06; 0:29]: This order of magnitude is in line with other evaluations.32
Results in Table 10 also show that short-time work saves permanent jobs but has no impact
on temporary jobs. As a result, the share of permanent jobs increases in rms using short-time
work, relative to other rms; this is in line with the empirical literature that uses cross-country
data.33
As results in Table 10 (row 5) demonstrate, short-time work reduces the death probability
for rms in the rst quintile, and only those. The e¤ect is economically signicant: the death
rate of rms beneting from short-time work decreases by 9% points, one-third of the standard
deviation of the death rate in the rst quintile (mean equal to 6:4%). This positive e¤ect, which
also contributes to save jobs, disappears above this lowest quintile.
In order to assess how robust these (heterogeneous) e¤ects are, Tables 11 to 14 report the
results when the distribution of rms is stratied in terciles rather than in quintiles. Table 13
reports the rst-stage results: the instruments are very signicant at every tercile. A comparison
of the IV estimates of the impact of short-time work on employment growth in Tables 14 and 10
indicates that the coe¢ cient is signicantly larger in the rst quintile than in the rst tercile.
Accounting for the di¤erence in the number of rms using short-time work in the rst tercile
and in the rst quintile, these results point to a similar number of jobs created, with a point
estimate equal to 10% of the total number of jobs in rms that used short-time work with
a 95% condence interval equal to [1%; 19%]versus 11% of jobs for all rms that used short-
time work with a 95% condence interval equal to [4%; 18%] when rms are stratied in
to ^1
P
i2Q1 `i where Q1 denotes the set of rms using short-time work that belong to the rst quintile of the
predicted revenue growth rate. There are 185; 676 jobs in 2008 in the rms using short-time work that belong to
the rst quintile and 74; 538 in the short-time work users that belong to the other quintiles. This implies that
short-time work increases employment in all rms that use short-time work by ^1  185; 676=260; 214 = 0:113
taking ^1 = 0:158 from the rst Column of Table 10.
31We divide the number of jobs created by short-time work in 2009 by the number of short-time work
employees in 2009 to get this number. Note that this gure is consistent with the claim that short-time work
saved about 11% of jobs of all rms which used short-time work because all employees are not necessarily on
short-time work in rms using short-time work.
32This result can be compared to Boeri and Bruecker (2011) who nd that a short-time work employee saved
about 0.35 jobs during the Great Recession in Germany with a 95% condence interval equal to [0:04; 0:70]. The
impact on employment is larger than in France, although less precisely estimated (the number of observations is
smaller in Germany). The stronger impact on employment in Germany is likely due to the larger drop in hours
worked of short-time work employees, which reached 40% on average, versus 7% in France. As a short-time work
employee experiences a reduction in her hours worked by 40% and created 0.35 jobs in Germany, short-time
work has had a very uncertain impact on the total number of hours in this country according to this evaluation.
33Cahuc and Carcillo (2011), Hijzen and Venn (2011).
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quintiles instead of terciles. Again, the employment e¤ects are concentrated onto permanent
jobs. Assessing robustness with respect to rmssurvival, Table 10 shows that short-time work
signicantly reduces the death rate of rms in the lowest quintile, whereas the estimate is
negative but not signicantly di¤erent from zero in the rst tercile (p-value = :102 - see Table
14). These results conrm that short-time work improves the survival of rms hit by very
strong negative shocks, and only those.
6.2.2 Heterogeneous E¤ects After 2009
At this stage, two stories about short-time work can be told. In the rst, the policy helps
rms with limited access to nancial markets, hit by transitory negative shocks, to recover and
grow in the following years. In the second, however, short-time work helps structurally weak
rms, without recovery potential, to keep jobs that will soon be destroyed. In order to assess
which story is most credible, we analyze the impact of the take-up of short-time work in 2009
on rmsoutcomes at the end of 2011. We estimate the same model as before, considering
changes in dependent variables from 2008 to 2011 instead of 2008 to 2009. Since 38% of rms
which used short-time work in 2009 used-short time work again in 2010 or 2011, we control
for repeated use. We also control for the commuting zone  sector leave-one-out mean of the
revenue growth rate from 2009 to 2010 and from 2010 to 2011.
Table 15 reports the results of the instrumental variable estimation of equation (9) in which
the dependent variable is either the growth rate from December 2008 to December 2011 of the
indicated variable or the death of the rm over the same period. Firms in the rst quintile
of the predicted revenue growth in 2009, for which short-time work had positive employment
e¤ects in 2009, also grow faster from 2008 to 2011, suggesting that short-time work helped
them to recover faster, potentially because they retained their workforce despite the negative
shock. There are no statistically signicant positive e¤ects for the rms which belong the other
quintiles of predicted revenue growth in 2009. Table 16 shows the robustness of this result by
reporting estimates for a stratication of rms into terciles. Again, rms faced with the largest
drop in predicted revenue in 2009 have faster employment growth in the following years than
rms belonging to the same tercile and which did not use short-time work.
Therefore, short-time work appears to be used by rms faced with a temporary negative
shock rather than by structurally weak rms. Indeed, Figure 12, conrms this view. The
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protability and the nancial situation of short-time work users was much more deteriorated,
in 2009, than that of non users. But it improved more rapidly for the former than for the latter,
coming back to its pre-2009 level as early as 2011, as shown in Table 17 (for rms belonging
to the lowest quintile of the predicted revenue growth in 2009). These results are consistent
with those of Giroud and Mueller (2017) and Caggese et al. (2018) who nd that rms with
weak balance-sheets or facing more stringent nancial constraints cut more jobs in response to
negative demand shocks, but are not less protable in the long run. They are also consistent
about the role that Giroud and Mueller (2017) mention played by short-time work, in helping
labor hoarding for rms faced with strong (temporary) drops in revenues and stringent nancial
constraints.
6.3 Cost per Job Saved
In this Section, we provide an evaluation of the cost per job saved in 2009. On average, each
employee on short-time work in 2009 reduced her working time by 123 hours and employers
received 3.70 euros per subsidized non-worked hour, or 460 euros per employee on short-time
work. This amount is small when compared to the average annual labor costs 38,600 euros 
in rms which used short-time work.
To compute the cost per job saved thanks to short-time work, we divide the total amount of
subsidies received by all rms in 2009 by the number of jobs saved in 2009 in the rst quintile
of the distribution of predicted revenue growth, assuming that no job has been created in the
other quintiles. This approach yields a conservative evaluation of the impact of short-time
work on job creation consistent with the results displayed by Table 10.34 The costs per job
saved in 2009 amount to 2619 euros, which corresponds to 6:8% of the average annual labor
costs in our set of rms with a 95% condence interval equal to [4:2%; 18:4%]. This sum is
extremely small compared to the costs (per job created) of wage subsidies, usually estimated
to lie between 100% and 200% of annual labor costs.35 As shown by our theoretical model, the
specic strength of short-time work is its targeting of employees at risk of losing their job in
34Using the stratication of rms by tercile instead yields similar results.
35The cost per job created of a permanent wage subsidy amounts to the labor cost divided by the absolute
value of the elasticity of labor demand with respect to labor cost (Cahuc et al. (2018)). Assuming that this
elasticity lies between  1 and  0:5 (Hamermesh (2014)), the cost per job created of a wage subsidy lies between
100% and 200% of the labor cost.
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Figure 12: Protability and nancial situation over 2008-2011 of rms using short-time work
in 2009.
Sources: DADS, FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Notes:  ROE: return on equity equal to EBITDA/Total Equity  ROA: return on assets, equal to
EBITDA/Total Assets  Coverage: EBTIDA/Interest expense  Leverage: Total debt / Total Assets;  Each
graph displays the di¤erence in the value of the corresponding index between rms using short-time work in
2009 and other rms, conditional on sector and rm age. The I-bars report the 95 percent condence interval.
Standard errors are clustered at the sector  département level.
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rms where these employeesmarginal product falls below their marginal labor cost, whereas
wage subsidies are usually given to all rmsemployees (who belong to some targeted category
based on age or past labor market experience, for instance) even if their marginal productivity
is actually well above their marginal labor cost. Short-time work turns out to have been more
e¤ective at creating jobs than hiring subsidies during the Great Recession in France, even
though hiring subsidies also targeted marginal jobs.36 Since available evidence suggests that
the government saves about 25% of the average labor cost when a low-wage individual goes
from non-employment to employment,37 we posit that short-time work allowed the government
to reduce public expenditure.
Windfall e¤ects associated with short-time work are much smaller than those induced by
wage subsidies policies. To assess the size of these windfall e¤ects, consider short-time work
subsidies paid to rms outside the lowest quintile of the predicted revenue growth rate in 2009.
These rms, representing about half of all rms with positive short-time work take-up in 2009,
only used 25% of the total number of subsidized hours in 2009 and received 25% of the total
amount of subsidies. Such numbers are consistent with our theoretical model since the drop in
hours worked is smaller for jobs that would not have been destroyed absent short-time work
than for jobs that would have been destroyed absent short-time work, as shown by Figure 4.
We also evaluate the impact of short-time work on the total amount of hours worked and
compare it to our models prediction. To do so, we assume that the average number of annual
hours worked for jobs saved by short-time work is identical to the average number of annual
hours worked in other jobs. Then, we compute the number of hours of work for the jobs saved
by short-time work. Subtracting the number of hours consumed by short-time work employees
from this number, we get the impact of short-time work on the total number of hours worked.
Results show that for every employee on short-time work in 2009, the total volume of hours
worked increased by 10% with a 95% condence interval equal to [ 1%; 21%] of her usual
annual number of hours. Hence, the direct reduction in the volume of hours worked due to
short-time work is more than o¤set by the creation of jobs induced by short-time work. This
means that short-time work not only saved jobs but also limited the drop in total hours.38
36Cahuc et al. (2018) assess the impact of hiring subsidies in France during the Great Recession and nd that
the cost per job created by a hiring credit in France in 2009 amounts to about 25% of the labor cost of a job.
37See Cahuc et al. (2018). This gure is also valid for France in 2009.
38As a short-time work employee experienced a reduction in her hours worked by 40% and created 0.35 jobs
in Germany, short-time work has had a very uncertain impact on the total number of hours in this country
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Although it might seem surprising that short-time work, a subsidy to a reduction in hours
worked, raises the total number of hours worked for some, this result in again fully line with
our model39 when, in recessions, negative shocks hit a large fraction of rms.
7 Conclusion
Germany, from being the sick man of Europe in the start of the 2000s, became its Superstar
in the 2010s (Dustmann et al., 2014). Hence, French politicians have repeatedly tried to copy
certain German policies, without much success. Apprenticeship, seen as the way out of the
Frances high youth unemployment rate, has never taken o¤ on the west side of the Rhine.
Hartz-style reforms, seen as the way out of an inexible labor market, have mostly generated
mass protests and strikes. Short-time work, seen as the way to preserve employment in the
face of negative economic shocks, is an exception. Used in France before the Great Recession,
albeit much less than in Germany, it was successfully expanded when the Great Recession hit
France. All regulations and institutions managing short-time work were already in place and
allowed increased funding to be directed to rms that applied to the program. The structure and
functioning of these institutions are central in our empirical strategy, allowing us to construct
instrumental variables for the use of short-time work. The conclusions of this empirical analysis
are pretty straightforward: short-time work preserved employment and limited the decrease in
the number of hours worked during the Great Recession. Permanent jobs, rather than temporary
ones, beneted from the policy. The policy helped highly levered rms, hit by transitory
negative shocks, to recover and even grow in the aftermath of the crisis. The cost of saving
those jobs was low, even very low compared to other job-preserving policies previously used in
France, such as wage subsidies, creation of public jobs, or hiring subsidies. Furthermore, only
those rms that faced a large negative shock beneted from this policy whereas (we show that)
the policy had no discernable e¤ect on rms faced with smaller shocks.
Hence, short-time work had desirable properties when the Great Recession hit. But the
e¤ectiveness of short-time work hinges on its design. From this perspective, our results suggest
ways to optimize short-time work schemes.
First, the scheme should be targeted at rms facing large drops in their revenues, and faced
according to the evaluation of Boeri and Bruecker (2011).
39See above, Section 3.3.
40
with credit constraints. A way to screen rms might be to subsidize short-time work for a
su¢ ciently large number of non-worked hours per employee rather than subsidizing from the
rst non-worked hour below the usual contractual number of hours worked, as is the case in
France, since employees whose hours worked are reduced by small amounts are less at risk of
seeing their jobs destroyed.
Second, introducing experience rating should reduce the windfall e¤ects, as stressed by
Burdett and Wright (1989). When nancial markets are imperfect, short-time work may be
useful to rms in temporary distress. However, if rms can use short-time work at no cost,
some rms may decide to make the policy their usual tool when faced with certain repetitive
shocks rather than search for other ways to overcome such temporary but recurring di¢ culties.
Finally, short-time work was never used by a large fraction of French rms: quite the
contrary since the take-up was at most 1% even in the depths of the Great Recession. Even
though short-time work had positive employment e¤ects for a fraction of this 1% of rms,
extending its scope is likely to reduce its e¤ectiveness. As stressed by Cooper et al. (2017),
extending the short-time work policy is likely to decrease allocative e¢ ciency on the labor
market, resulting in signicant output losses.
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A Appendix
A.1 Competitive Equilibrium Contract
This Appendix determines the solution to program (4) which denes the optimal number of vacancies
and the optimal contract fw(y); h(y);
g. Since the equilibrium value of the labor market tightness 
in each labor pool is determined by the no-arbitrage condition (1), it is clear that  in each labor pool
does not depend on the number of vacant jobs v posted by the rm. It is determined by the expected
utility W associated with the contract posted by the rm. Therefore, maximization of vm() C(v)
with respect to v yields equation (6).
In order to nd the optimal contract, it is convenient to solve the program of the rms in two
stages. In the rst stage, we determine the prot maximizing expected utility W associated with the
contract posted by the rm. In the second stage, we determine the properties of the optimal contract.
First, let us dene the expected job surplus
S =W   [b  (0)] + : (A1)
The denition of the expected job surplus implies that  = S W +[b  (0)] : Therefore, for any
value of S the rm chooses the expected utility W that solves
max
W
m() [S  W + [b  (0)]] ;
where  satises the no-arbitrage condition (1). The solution is
W   [b  (0)] = S; (A2)
where  =  m0()=m() 2 (0; 1) is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemploy-
ment. Using the denition (A1) of the surplus, this solution can also be written  = (1  )S: Since
the expected prot of the rm is proportional to the expected job surplus at the optimum, the optimal
contract necessarily maximizes the expected job surplus.
In the second stage, let us maximize the expected job surplus with respect to 
 and h(y)  0:
Let us denote by (y) the multiplier associated with the constraint h(y)  0: The Lagrangian of this
maximization problem is
L = S +
Z
y2

(y)h(y)dy:
The expected surplus can be written, using equations (2) and (5):
S =
Z
y2

s(y)dG(y);
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where
s(y) = yh(y)  (h(y)) + max h  h(y); 0  [b  (0)] (A3)
stands for the surplus of jobs of productivity y: Maximization of the Lagrangian with respect to h(y)
yields
@L
@h(y)
= 0) h(y) =
8<:
0 1(y) if y  y
0 1(y   ) if y0  y < y
0 if y < y0
(A4)
where y =

yj0(h) = y	 and y0 = yj0(0) = y	 :
Now, let us determine the optimal productivity set 
: The envelope theorem implies that s0(y) =
h(y)  0 at the optimum. This means that s0(y) is either positive or equal to zero.
Let us rst consider the case where s0(y) = 0:We know from equation (A4) that this case is possible
only if there exists y  y0 such that h(y) = 0: When h(y) = 0, equation (A3) yields s(y) = h  b: If
h  b > 0, it is optimal to keep all jobs whatever the realization of y since it su¢ ces to set h(y) = 0
to get a positive job surplus. In this case, the rm keeps workers who work zero hour when their
productivity drops below the threshold y0.
In the more relevant empirical case where the maximum value of the short-time compensation h
is smaller than the unemployment benet b, h   b is negative and the constraint h(y)  0 cannot
bind, because it cannot be optimal to keep jobs which yield a negative surplus. In this case, we
have h(y) > 0 and s0(y) is strictly positive for all y. Maximization of L requires that if y0 2 
 all
y > y0 also belong to 
: Therefore, assuming that the bottom value of y; denoted by ymin; satises
s(ymin) < 0, the optimal set of productivities for which the jobs are not destroyed is 
 = fyjy > ~yg
where ~y = fy > yminjs(y) = 0g, which implies, using the denition (A3) of s(y); that ~y statises
~yh(~y)  (h(~y))  b+ (0) + max h  h(~y); 0 = 0: (A5)
Equations (A4) and (A5) dene the optimal contingent hours worked h(y) and the reservation
productivity ~y. Then, all wage functions w(y) which satisfy condition (A2) can belong to the optimal
contract. The shape of h(y) and the reservation productivity are depicted on Figures 4 and 4.
A.2 Comparison of Job Subsidies and Short-Time Work Compen-
sation
The model allows us to show that short-time work reduces job destruction at lower cost for the
government than job subsidies which provided to all jobs and do not depend on hours worked. Let
 denote the subsidy per job. We compare the impact of short-time work compensation, equal to
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max

h  h(y); 0, to the subsidy  per job in the neighborhood of  =  = 0. Insofar as these two
schemes have, by denition in the present context, the same impact on the expected labor cost of
each rm, and then on the creation of vacant jobs, we do not need to account for their e¤ects on job
vacancies to compare their impact on employment.
The impact of the job subsidy  on the threshold value of productivity ~y below which jobs are
destroyed is dened by equation (A5) which can be written, in presence of the job subsidy
~yh(~y)  (h(~y))  [b  (0)] +  = 0; (A6)
Equation (A6) implies, together with the envelope theorem, that d~y=d =  1=h(~y): Therefore, since
the density of jobs of productivity ~y is equal to vm()g(~y) in each rm, the subsidy  creates
1
h(~y)
Nvm()g(~y) (A7)
jobs in the economy, where N denotes the (exogenous) number of rms at the start of the period.
Note that ex-post, once the productivity shocks z and " have been realized, some rms may have zero
employees, meaning that they are destroyed.
The impact of short-time work compensation can be computed from equation (A5), which denes ~y
when there is short-time work. Di¤erentiation of equation (A5) implies that d~y=d =   h  h(~y) =h(~y):
Therefore, the short-time compensation equal to max

h  h(y); 0 creates
h  h(~y)
h(~y)
Nvm()g(~y) (A8)
jobs and costs 
R y
~y
h h(y)
1 G(~y)dG(y) per employee (including those who do not use short-time work in the
rm).
Assume now that the cost per employee of the short-time compensation is equal to the job subsidy
: This implies that  = =
R y
~y
h h(y)
1 G(~y)dG(y): Substituting this expression of  into equation (A8), we
nd that short-time work creates
h  h(~y)
h(~y)
R y
~y
h h(y)
1 G(~y)dG(y)
Nvm()g(~y) (A9)
jobs. From equations (A7) and (A9) it can be deduced that the ratio between the number of job
created by short-time work and by the job subsidy for an identical cost per employee (or equivalently
an identical expenditure) is given by equation (8).
47
A.3 The e¤ect of short-time work on total hours worked
This appendix computes the impact of the short-time work compensation  on the total number of
hours worked in the neighborhood of  = 0 assuming that the number of job creations vm() is given.
This allows us to exhibit a su¢ cient condition to get a positive e¤ect of short-time work on the total
number of hours of work insofar as the short-time compensation (nanced by a lump sum tax paid by
all workers), which raises the expected value of lled jobs, increases job creation.
By denition, the total number of hours worked is
H = m()vN
Z y
~y
h(y)dG(y) +
Z 1
y
h(y)dG(y)

where y =

yjh(y) = h	, ~y is the threshold value of productivity below which jobs are destroyed and
N is the number of rms in the economy. From this denition, and the fact that dh(y)=d = 0 if
y  y; shown in Appendix A.1, we get
1
m()vN
dH
d
=  d~y
d
h(~y)g(~y) +
Z y
~y
dh(y)
d
dG(y):
From equation (A4), we know that dh(y)=d =  dh(y)=dy; and from equation (A5) we have d~y=d =
  h  h(~y) =h(~y); which implies that
1
m()vN
dH
d
=

h  h(~y) g(~y)  Z y
~y
@h(y)
@y
dG(y):
Integration by parts gives
dH
d
=  m()vN
Z y
~y

h  h(~y)dg(y):
This expression is positive if g0(y) < 0 for y 2 [~y; y]:
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Table 1: Characteristics of rms with and without short-time work in 2009
STW = 1 STW = 0
Revenue growth rate  :17
(:00)
:05
(:00)
Leverage rate :25
(:00)
:27
(:00)
Employment growth rate  :14
(:00)
 :05
(:00)
Hourly gross wage 14:21
(:05)
13:81
(:07)
Hours worked per worker 1687:16
(3:42)
1617:36
(1:08)
Turnover rate 1:33
(:01)
1:67
(:00)
Share of temporary jobs :11
(:00)
:20
(:00)
Number of employees 20:32
(:54)
6:95
(:03)
Age 18:5
(:15)
13:49
(:01)
Observations 11; 313 757; 030
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope: © Mainland France excluding Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture. © Single-establishment
rms.
Denitions: © The revenue growth rate is dened as the di¤erence in the revenue between 2009 and 2008,
divided by the revenue in 2008. © The leverage rate is dened as the level of debt divided by the level
of assets © The employment growth rate is dened as the di¤erence in the number of employees
between the 31st of December 2009 and the 31st of December 2008, divided by the number of employees
on the 31st of December 2008. © The hourly gross wage is dened as the total labor cost divided by the
total number of hours worked. © The number of hours worked per worker is dened as the total number
of hours worked divided by the average number of employees. © The turnover rate is dened as the
total number of employees present at least one hour in the rm during the year divided by the average
number of employees. © The share of temporary jobs is dened as the number of employees under
non-permanent contracts divided by the total number of employees. © The number of employees is
dened as the number of employees on the 31st of December 2008. © The age is dened as the
di¤erence between 2009 and the year of creation of the rm.
Notes: © STW = 1 stands for the rms using short-time work for economic reasons in 2009; STW = 0
stands for the rms not using short-time work in 2009. © Standard errors of the means are reported in
parentheses.
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Table 2: Short-time work take-up rate by industry in 2009
STW take-up Number of rms
Construction :012
(:000)
206; 705
Finance, insurance and real estate :005
(:000)
45; 800
Information and communication :006
(:000)
27; 040
Manufacturing and extractive industries :064
(:001)
115; 101
Specialized, scientic and technical services :010
(:000)
111; 375
Wholesale and retail trade, transport :006
(:000)
439; 034
Sources: DADS and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope: © Mainland France excluding Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture. © Single-establishment
rms. © Standard errors of the means are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3: Determinants of the short-time work take-up of the establishments belonging to multi-
establishment rms in 2008.
Short-time work take-up
Share of response time>14 days  :226
(:048)

Commuting zone revenue growth rate  3:412
(:810)

Hourly gross wage :003
(:002)
Hours worked per worker :000
(:000)
Turnover rate  :003
(:002)
Share of temporary jobs  :057
(:002)

Sector-specic xed e¤ect Yes
Firm-specic xed e¤ect Yes
Adj-R2 0:41
Observations 322; 517
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope: © Mainland France excluding Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture.
Denitions: © The dependent variable is equal to 100 if the establishment uses short-time work for economic
reasons in 2009 and to 0 otherwise. © The share of response time longer than 14 days is dened as the
proportion of short-time work applications whose response time is longer than 14 days in the
département of the establishment in 2008. © The commuting zone revenue growth rate is dened as the
average at the commuting zone level of the revenue growth rate, dened as the di¤erence in the revenue
between 2008 and 2007, divided by the absolute value of the revenue in 2007. © The leverage is equal to
1 if the leverage rate, dened as the level of debts divided by the level of assets, belongs to the highest
quartile, in 2007. © The hourly gross wage is equal to 1 if the hourly gross wage, dened as the total
labor cost divided by the total number of hours worked, is above the median wage, in 2007. © The
number of hours worked per worker is dened as the total number of hours worked divided by the
average number of employees, in 2007. © The turnover rate is dened as the total number of employees
divided by the average number of employees, in 2007. © The share of temporary jobs is dened as the
number of employees under non-permanent contracts divided by the total number of employees, in
2007. © The number of employees is dened as an indicator variable of the number of employees on the
31st of December 2007 (10, 50, 250, and 1,000 employees). © The age is dened as the di¤erence
between 2009 and the year of creation of the rm.
Notes: © This table displays the ordinary least squares estimation of the short-time work take-up of
establishments belonging to multi-establishment rms. © The sector-specic xed e¤ects of the
establishments are disaggregated in 728 sectors. © The number of hours worked per worker, the
turnover rate, the share of temporary jobs, the number of employees and the age are also included in
the regressors. © Robust standard errors are clustered at the sector x département level and reported
between parentheses. © p-values: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 4: The probability of short-time work use in the rst quarter of 2009 and the distance to
multi-establishment rms
(1) (2) (3)
Dep variable: Short-time work use in rst quarter of 2009
Distance  :042
(:012)
  :053
(:012)
  :053
(:012)

Adj-R2 0:001 0:014 0:014
Observations 12; 304 12; 304 12; 304
Sources: DADS, FICUS, FARE (INSEE ), DMMO, Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope: © Mainland France excluding Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture.
Denitions: © The dependent variable is either equal to 1 if the single establisment rm uses short-time work
in the rst quarter of 2009 instead of later in the year or equal to zero otherwise. © Distanceis either
equal to 0 if the single establishment rm belongs to the rst quartile of distance to establishments
belonging to multi-establishment rms which used short-time work in 2008, or equal to 1 otherwise.
Notes: © The results reported in column (1) do not include any covariate, © Column (2) includes the
following covariates: the revenue growth rate, the leverage rate, the hourly gross wage, the number of
hours worked per worker, the turnover rate, the share of temporary jobs, the number of employees, the
age and (728) sector-specic xed e¤ects, the départemental proportion of short-time work applications
whose response time is longer than 14 days in 2008. The revenue growth rate is dened as the
di¤erence in the revenue between 2009 and 2008, divided by the absolute value of the revenue in 2008.
The leverage rate is dened as the level of debt divided by the level of assets, in the previous year. The
hourly gross wage is dened as the total labor cost divided by the total number of hours worked, in the
previous year. The number of hours worked per worker is dened as the total number of hours worked
divided by the average number of employees, in the previous year. The turnover rate is dened as the
total number of employees divided by the average number of employees, in the previous year. The share
of temporary jobs is dened as the number of employees under non-permanent contracts divided by the
total number of employees, in the previous year. The number of employees is dened as an indicator
variable of the number of employees on the 31st of December of the previous year (10, 50, 250, and
1,000 employees). The age is dened as the di¤erence between 2009 (respectively 2008) and the year of
creation of the rm. © Column (3) adds the quarterly employment growth rate of the sector of the rm
(728 sectors) to the covariates of column (2). © OLS estimation. © Robust standard errors are clustered
at the sector x département level and reported between parentheses. © p-values: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
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Table 5: Determinants of the short-time work take-up and of the revenue growth rate of single-
establishment rms in 2009.
Short-time work take-up Revenue growth rate
Share of response time>14 days  :953
(0:113)
  :151
(0:363)
Distance to the past short-time work user  :007
(:001)
  :013
(0:005)
Leverage :167
(:032)
 1:005
(0:214)
Hourly gross wage :147
(:033)
  1:237
(0:155)
Hours worked per worker :205
(:023)
  3:921
(0:119)
Turnover rate  :191
(:033)
 :607
(0:128)
Share of temporary jobs  :136
(:030)
 1:355
(0:120)
10  Number of employees < 50 1:724
(:102)
  1:526
(:177)

50  Number of employees < 250 1:724
(:322)
  3:607
(:355)

250  Number of employees < 1000 5:232
(:023)
  7:205
(1:093)

1000  Number of employees 8:180
(3:478)
22:54
(17:45)
Adj-R2 :090 0:209
F 44:67 125:36
Prob F > 0 :000 :000
Observations 768; 343 768; 343
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP). Scope: © Mainland France excluding
Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture. Denitions: © The rst dependent variable is equal
to 100 if the establishment uses short-time work for economic reasons in 2009 and to 0 otherwise. ©
The second dependent variable is the revenue growth rate, dened as the di¤erence in the revenue
between 2009 and 2008, divided by the absolute value of the revenue in 2008, and expressed in
percentage. © The share of response time longer than 14 days is dened as the proportion of short-time
work applications whose response time is longer than 14 days in the département of the establishment
in 2008. © The distance to the past short-time work user is dened as the distance to the closest
establishment, belonging to a multi-establishment rm, which used short-time work in 2008. © The
leverage is equal to 1 if the leverage rate, dened as the level of debts divided by the level of assets,
belongs to the highest quartile, in 2008. © The hourly gross wage is equal to 1 if the hourly gross wage,
dened as the total labor cost divided by the total number of hours worked, is above the median wage,
in 2008. © The number of hours worked per worker is dened as the total number of hours worked
divided by the average number of employees, in 2008. © The turnover rate is dened as the total
number of employees divided by the average number of employees, in 2008. © The share of temporary
jobs is dened as the number of employees under non-permanent contracts divided by the total number
of employees, in 2008. © The number of employees is dened as an indicator variable of the number of
employees on the 31st of December 2008 (10, 50, 250, and 1,000 employees). © The age is dened as the
di¤erence between 2009 and the year of creation of the rm. Notes: © This table displays the ordinary
least squares estimation of equations (12) and (13). © The sector x commuting zone revenue growth
rate, the leverage, the hourly gross wage, the number of hours worked per worker, the turnover rate, the
share of temporary jobs, the number of employees, the age and the (728) sector-specic xed e¤ects are
also included in the regressors. © Robust standard errors are clustered at the sector x département level
and reported between parentheses. © p-values: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. © The F statistic in
the rst column tests the joint signicance of the share of response time greater than14 days and the
distance to the past short-time work user, the F statistic in the second column adds the leave out mean
of the revenue growth rate in the industry and commuting zone by decile (coe¢ cients not reported).
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Table 6: Short-time work take-up, survival and employment growth of rms in 2009.
OLS IV
Death rate  0:030
(:002)
 :0216
(0:0432)
Employment growth rate  :028
(:003)
 :051
(:069)
Share of permanent jobs 0:025
(:002)
 :098
(:047)

Relative growth rate of permanent jobs  :003
(:003)
:086
(:077)
Relative growth rate of temporary jobs  0:017
(:002)
  :038
(:058)
Observations 768; 343 768; 343
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope: © Mainland France excluding Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture.
Denitions: © The death rate is equal to 1 if the rm has zero employee on the 31st of December 2009 and 0
otherwise. © The employment growth rate is dened as the di¤erence in the number of employees
between the 31st of December 2009 and the 31st of December 2008, divided by the number of employees
on the 31st of December 2008. © The share of permanent jobs is dened as the number of permanent
jobs divided by the total number of employees, on the 31st of December 2009. © The relative growth
rate of permanent jobs is dened as the di¤erence in the number of employees under permanent
contracts between the 31st of December 2009 and the 31st of December 2008, divided by the total
number of employees on the 31st of December 2008. © The relative growth rate of temporary jobs is
dened as the di¤erence in the employees under non-permanent contracts between the 31st of December
2009 and the 31st of December 2008, divided by the total number of employees on the 31st of December
2008. © See Table 5.
Notes: © This table displays the estimation of the 1 coe¢ cient of equation (9) with ordinary least squares
(column OLS) and instrumental variable (column IV). © The instruments are the share of response
time longer than 14 days, the distance to the past short-time work user, and the sector x commuting
zone revenue growth rate. © The leverage, the hourly gross wage, the number of hours worked per
worker, the turnover rate, the share of temporary jobs, the number of employees, the age and the (728)
sector-specic xed e¤ects are also included in the regressors. © Robust standard errors are clustered at
the sector x département level and reported between parentheses. © p-values: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
54
Table 7: Characteristics of rms by quintile of their predicted revenue growth rate
Quintile Number of rms Short-time work rate Revenue growth rate p-value
(in percent) STW = 1 STW = 0
1 153; 669 3:92  :26
(:00)
 :13
(:00)
:000
2 153; 669 1:27  :17
(:01)
 :04
(:00)
:000
3 153; 668 0:9  :14
(:01)
  :01
(:00)
:000
4 153; 669 0:7 :09
(:01)
:04
(:00)
:000
5 153; 668 0:6 :31
(:03)
:38
(:00)
:000
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope: © Mainland France excluding Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture.
Denitions: © The short-time work rate is dened as the number of rms using short-time work for economic
reasons divided by the total number of rms, in 2009. © The revenue growth rate is dened as the
di¤erence in the revenue between 2009 and 2008, divided by the absolute value of the revenue in 2008.
Notes: © This table displays the features of the quintiles of rms according to their revenue growth rate in
2009 predicted by equation (13). © STW = 1 stands for the single-establishment rms using short-time
work for economic reasons in 2009; STW = 0 stands for the single-establishment rms not using
short-time work in 2009. © The last column reports the p-value for the null hypothesis: Revenue
growth rate (STW = 0) = Revenue growth rate (STW = 1). © The standard errors of the means are
reported in parentheses.
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Table 8: Characteristics of rms using short-time work in 2009 by quintile of their predicted
revenue growth rate
Quintile Number of rms Revenue Number of employees Age
1 6; 020 4; 393:72
(19;144:53)
27:15
(:86)
22:97
(:22)
2 1; 963 1; 963:71
(7;357:18)
13:89
(:94)
18:27
(:32)
3 1; 397 1; 319:05
(4;529:2)
10:51
(:68)
13:86
(:32)
4 1; 001 1; 349:48
(11;778:21)
11:02
(1:83)
10:39
(:35)
5 932 2; 283:39
(12;113:67)
14:53
(2:10)
5:78
(:31)
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope: © Mainland France excluding Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture. © establishments using
short-time work for economic reasons.
Denitions: © The number of employees is dened as the number of employees on the 31st of December
2008. © The age is dened as the di¤erence between 2009 and the year of creation of the rm.
Notes: © This table displays the features of rms using short-time work in 2009 by quintile (among all rms,
including short-time work users and other rms) of their revenue growth rate in 2009 predicted by
equation (13). © The standard errors of the means are reported in parentheses.
56
Table 9: Determinants of the short-time work take-up of rms in 2009 (rst stage short-time
work estimates of the instrumental variable estimation) by quintile of their predicted revenue
growth rate
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
Share of response time>14 days  1:854
(0:348)
  :968
(:0178)
   :832
(:0149)
   :552
(:0124)
   :412
(:0117)

Distance to the past short-time work user  :020
(:004)
  :001
(:002)
 :007
(:002)
  :006
(:002)
  :001
(:002)
Adj-R2 :14 :03 :02 :03 :02
F 23:24 14:83 19:37 12:42 6:24
Prob F > 0 :000 :000 :000 :000 :000
Observations 153; 669 153; 669 153; 668 153; 669 153; 668
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope: © Mainland France excluding Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture.
Denitions: See Table 5.
Notes: © This table displays the rst stage short-time work estimates of the instrumental variable estimation
of equation (9). © The regressions are run by quintile of revenue growth rate of rms in 2009 predicted
by equation (13). © The commuting zone revenue growth rate, the leverage, the hourly gross wage, the
number of hours worked per worker, the turnover rate, the share of temporary jobs, the number of
employees, the age and the (728) sector-specic xed e¤ects are also included in the regressors. ©
Robust standard errors are clustered at the sector x département level and reported between
parentheses. © p-values: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. © The F statistic for the joint signicance of
the two instrumental variables is reported.
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Table 10: Short-time work take-up, survival and employment growth of rms in 2009 by quintile
of their predicted revenue growth rate
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
Death rate  :0876
(:033)
 :040
(:087)
:029
(:096)
:237
(:127)
 :226
(:155)
Employment growth rate :158
(:051)
:108
(:140)
:058
(:167)
 :129
(:201)
 :309
(:273)
Share of permanent jobs :068
(:032)
:145
:090)
:199
(:167)
  :013
(:149)
:235
(:173)
Relative growth rate of permanent jobs :176
(:053)
 :221
(:137)
:193
(:164)
 :237
(:207)
 :187
(:280)
Relative growth rate of temporary jobs :007
(:039)
 :082
(:110)
:145
(:144)
:001
(:176)
 :154
(:228)
Observations 153; 669 153; 669 153; 668 153; 669 153; 668
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope: © Mainland France excluding Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture.
Denitions: See Table 6.
Notes: © This table displays the estimation of equation (9) with instrumental variable. © The regressions are
run by quintile of revenue growth rate of rms in 2009 predicted by equation (13). © The endogenous
variables are the short-time work take-up and the revenue growth rate. © The instruments are the share
of response time longer than 14 days, the distance to the past short-time work user, and the sector x
commuting zone revenue growth rate. © The leverage, the hourly gross wage, the number of hours
worked per worker, the turnover rate, the share of temporary jobs, the number of employees, the age
and the (728) sector-specic xed e¤ects are also included in the regressors. © Robust standard errors
are clustered at the sector x département level and reported between parentheses. © p-values: * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 11: Characteristics of rms by tercile of their predicted revenue growth rate
Tercile Number of rms Short-time work rate Revenue growth rate p-value
(in percent) STW = 1 STW = 0
1 256; 115 2:90  :25
(:00)
 :09
(:00)
:000
2 256; 114 0:90  :13
(:01)
 :01
(:00)
:000
3 256; 114 0:61 :15
(:02)
:25
(:00)
:000
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope: © Mainland France excluding Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture.
Denitions: © The short-time work rate is dened as the number of rms using short-time work for economic
reasons divided by the total number of rms, in 2009. © The revenue growth rate is dened as the
di¤erence in the revenue between 2009 and 2008, divided by the absolute value of the revenue in 2008.
Notes: © This table displays the features of the terciles of rms according to their revenue growth rate in 2009
predicted by equation (13). © STW = 1 stands for the single-establishment rms using short-time work
for economic reasons in 2009; STW = 0 stands for the single-establishment rms not using short-time
work in 2009. © The last column reports the p-value for the null hypothesis: Rev growth rate (STW=0)
= Rev growth rate (STW=1). © The standard errors of the means are reported in parentheses.
Table 12: Characteristics of rms using short-time work in 2009 by tercile of their predicted
revenue growth rate
Tercile Number of rms Revenue Number of employees Age
1 7; 340 2; 024:90
(21;776:36)
24:79
(:72)
18:35
(:19)
2 2; 301 1; 173:90
(10;492:39)
10:36
(1:51)
14:35
(:26)
3 1; 572 962:46
(15;001:66)
13:80
(1:70)
7:97
(:26)
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope: © Mainland France excluding Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture.
Denitions: © The number of employees is dened as the number of employees on the 31st of December
2008. © The age is dened as the di¤erence between 2009 and the year of creation of the rm.
Notes: © This table displays the features of rms using short-time work in 2009 by tercile (among all rms,
including short-time work users and other rms) of their revenue growth rate in 2009 predicted by
equation (13). © The standard errors of the means are reported in parentheses.
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Table 13: Determinants of the short-time work take-up of rms in 2009 (rst stage short-time
work estimates of the instrumental variable estimation) by tercile of their predicted revenue
growth rate.
Tercile 1 2 3
Share of response time>14 days  1:548
(:245)
  :754
(:123)
  :475
(:097)

Distance to the past short-time work user  :0116
(:00295)
  :005
(:002)
  :003
(:001)

Adj-R2 :12 :02 :03
F 27:30 21:15 13:36
Prob F > 0 :000 :000 :000
Observations 256; 115 256; 114 256; 114
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope: © Mainland France excluding Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture.
Denitions: See Table 5.
Notes: © This table displays the rst stage short-time work estimates of the instrumental variable estimation
of equation (9). © The regressions are run by tercile of revenue growth rate of rms in 2009 predicted
by equation (13). © The commuting zone revenue growth rate, the leverage, the hourly gross wage, the
number of hours worked per worker, the turnover rate, the share of temporary jobs, the number of
employees, the age and the (728) sector-specic xed e¤ects are also included in the regressors. ©
Robust standard errors are clustered at the sector x département level and reported between
parentheses. © p-values: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. © The F statistic for the joint signicativity
of the 2 explanatory variables is reported.
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Table 14: Short-time work take-up, survival and employment growth of rms in 2009 by tercile
of their predicted revenue growth rate
Tercile 1 2 3
Death rate  :057
(:035)
:009
(:096)
:218
(:141)
Employment growth rate :125
(:054)
 :135
(:158)
 :173
(:247)
Share of permanent jobs :084
(:033)
:139
(:118)
:225
(:158)
Relative growth rate of permanent jobs :176
(:056)
 :197
(:166)
:001
(:271)
Relative growth rate of temporary jobs  :018
(:041)
 :154
(:141)
 :238
(:202)
Observations 256; 115 256; 114 256; 114
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope: © Mainland France excluding Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture.
Denitions: See Table 6.
Notes: © This table displays the estimation of equation (9) with instrumental variable. © The regressions are
run by tercile of revenue growth rate of rms in 2009 predicted by equation (13). © The endogenous
variables are the short-time work take-up and the revenue growth rate. © The instruments are the share
of response time longer than 14 days, the distance to the past short-time work user, and the sector x
commuting zone revenue growth rate. © The leverage, the hourly gross wage, the number of hours
worked per worker, the turnover rate, the share of temporary jobs, the number of employees, the age
and the (728) sector-specic xed e¤ects are also included in the regressors. © Robust standard errors
are clustered at the sector x département level and reported between parentheses. © p-values: * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 15: Short-time work take-up, survival and employment growth of rms in 2009-2011 by
quintile of their predicted revenue growth rate in 2009
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
Death Indicator  :201
(:111)
 :326
(:222)
 :352
(:253)
:196
(:297)
 :0:83
(:350)
Employment growth rate :443
(:145)
 0:283
(:301)
:402
(:328)
 :258
(:423)
:375
(:538)
Observations 153; 594 153; 593 153; 593 153; 593 153; 593
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope: © Mainland France excluding Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture.
Denitions: © The death indicator is equal to 1 if the rm has zero employee on the 31st of December 2011
and 0 otherwise. © The employment growth rate is dened as the di¤erence in the number of employees
between the 31st of December 2011 and the 31st of December 2008, divided by the number of employees
on the 31st of December 2008. © See Table 5. © The sector x département death rate is dened as the
average at the sector x département level of the death rate, equal to 1 if the rm has zero employee on
the 31st of December 2011 and 0 otherwise. © The sector x département employment growth rate is
dened as the average at the sector x département level of the employment growth rate, dened as the
di¤erence in the number of employees between the 31st of December 2010 and the 31st of December
2009, divided by the number of employees on the 31st of December 2009. © The sector x département
revenue growth rate is dened as the average at the sector x département level of the revenue growth
rate, dened as the di¤erence in the revenue between 2010 and 2009, divided by the absolute value of
the revenue in 2009. © The 2010 short-time work take-up is equal to 1 if the establishment uses
short-time work in 2010 and to 0 otherwise.
Notes: © This table displays the estimation of equation (9) with instrumental variable. © The regressions are
run by quintile of revenue growth rate of rms in 2009 predicted by equation (13). © The endogeneous
variables are the short-time work take-up and the revenue growth rate. © The instruments are the share
of response time longer than 14 days, the distance to the past short-time work user, and the sector x
commuting zone revenue growth rate. © Previous (year 2008) leverage, hourly gross wage, number of
hours worked per worker, turnover rate, share of temporary jobs, rm size (10-50-250-1000 employees),
age, are included in the regressors. The sector-specic xed e¤ects, the 2010 and 2011 short-time work
take-up, the sector x département leave-one-out 2009, 2010 and 2011 mean revenue growth rate are also
included in the regressors. © Robust standard errors clustered at the sector x département level are
reported in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 16: Short-time work take-up, survival and employment growth of rms in 2009-2011 by
tercile of their predicted revenue growth rate in 2009
Tercile 1 2 3
Death rate  :163
(:120)
 :216
(:265)
 :232
(:302)
Employment growth rate :307
(:166)
:480
(:366)
 :451
(:461)
Observations 256; 058 256; 059 256; 059
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope: © Mainland France excluding Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture.
Denitions: © The death indicator is equal to 1 if the rm has zero employee on the 31st of December 2011
and 0 otherwise. © The employment growth rate is dened as the di¤erence in the number of employees
between the 31st of December 2011 and the 31st of December 2008, divided by the number of employees
on the 31st of December 2008. © See Table 5. © The sector x département death rate is dened as the
average at the sector x département level of the death rate, equal to 1 if the rm has zero employee on
the 31st of December 2011 and 0 otherwise. © The sector x département employment growth rate is
dened as the average at the sector x département level of the employment growth rate, dened as the
di¤erence in the number of employees between the 31st of December 2010 and the 31st of December
2009, divided by the number of employees on the 31st of December 2009. © The sector x département
revenue growth rate is dened as the average at the sector x département level of the revenue growth
rate, dened as the di¤erence in the revenue between 2010 and 2009, divided by the absolute value of
the revenue in 2009. © The 2010 short-time work take-up is equal to 1 if the establishment uses
short-time work in 2010 and to 0 otherwise.
Notes: © This table displays the estimation of equation (9) with instrumental variable. © The regressions are
run by quintile of revenue growth rate of rms in 2009 predicted by equation (13). © The endogeneous
variables are the short-time work take-up and the revenue growth rate. © The instruments are the share
of response time longer than 14 days, the distance to the past short-time work user, and the sector x
commuting zone revenue growth rate. © Previous (year 2008) leverage, hourly gross wage, number of
hours worked per worker, turnover rate, share of temporary jobs, rm size (10-50-250-1000 employees),
age, are included in the regressors. The sector-specic xed e¤ects, the 2010 and 2011 short-time work
take-up, the sector x département leave-one-out 2009, 2010 and 2011 mean revenue growth rate are also
included in the regressors. © Robust standard errors clustered at the sector x département level are
reported between parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 17: Protability and nancial situation over 2008-2011 of rms using short-time work in
2009 and belonging to the lowest quintile of the predicted revenue growth in 2009
Quintile 2008 2009 2010 2011
Return on assets  :024
(:002)
 :065
(:003)
 :037
(:003)
 :020
(:002)
Return on equity  :033
(:004)
 :125
(:006)
 :061
(:006)
 :026
(:005)
Interest coverage  10:658
(1:415)
 29:261
(1:847)
 20:092
(2:118)
 10:462
(2:249)
Leverage :004
(:002)
:011
(:002)
:005
(:002)
:001
(:002)
Nb of observations 153; 594 153; 594 153; 594 153; 594
Sources: DADS, FICUS and FARE (INSEE ) and Sinapse (DGEFP).
Scope: © Mainland France excluding Corsica. © Market sectors excluding agriculture.
Denitions: © Return on equity is equal to EBITDA/Total Equity © Return on assets is equal to
EBITDA/Total Assets © Coverage is equal to EBTIDA/Interest expense. © Leverage is equal to Total
debt / Total Assets;
Notes: © The table reports the di¤erence in the value of the corresponding index between rms using
short-time work in 2009 and other rms, conditional on sector and rm age © Standard errors clustered
at the sector x département level are reported between parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
64
